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Fingerprint identification technology for its implementation in the Schengen Information System II 
(SIS-II)  
This report presents the results of a JRC study on the readiness and availability of Automatic Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) technologies for their introduction in the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS-II), The study summarises a review of the scientific literature, visits to authorities managing AFIS in 
nine Member States and in the United States of America and consultations with eu-LISA and with AFIS vendors. An 
external scientific board of international experts reviewed the results and conclusions of the study. The report 
concludes that AFIS technology has reached a satisfactory level of readiness and availability and proposes a series 
of recommendations in order to accomplish a successful implementation of a SIS-II AFIS. 
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 Executive summary  
This report details the results of a JRC study on the readiness and availability of Automatic Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) technologies for their introduction in the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS-II). The study was carried out for DG HOME via an Administrative 
Arrangement.  
Policy context 
Created as a compensatory measure for the abolition of internal border checks within the Schengen 
area, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was established with two intentions: to contribute to law 
enforcement cooperation between the Member States and to support external border control. The 
SIS was the first so-called large-scale IT system launched by the EU Member States in 1995. It was 
followed by EURODAC (asylum seekers’ database) in 2003 and the Visa Information System (VIS) in 
2011. The second generation of the system, SIS-II, entered into operation on 9 April 2013.  
SIS-II enables competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on 
certain categories of wanted or missing persons and objects. In the case of alerts related to persons, 
SIS-II offers the possibility to process biometric data. However the possibility to identify a person on 
the basis of his/her fingerprints – a functionality which would require the implementation of an 
Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) – is conditional on the preparation of “a report on 
the availability and readiness of the required technology, on which the European Parliament shall be 
consulted” (see Articles 22(c) of SIS-II Decision1 and Regulation2).  
The objectives of the study are to address the requirement stated in Article 22(c) and to provide 
information on whether fingerprint identification technology is mature enough for its integration into 
SIS-II.  
The report presents the main findings of the study together with a series of recommendations for 
successful implementation of AFIS functionality. The complete technical specification of an AFIS for 
SIS-II would still require further study. 
The JRC conducted an in-depth analysis of AFIS technology including: a review of the scientific 
literature, visits to authorities managing AFIS in nine Member States and in the United States of 
America and consultations with eu-LISA 3  and with AFIS vendors. An external scientific board of 
renowned international experts reviewed the results and conclusions of the study. 
The report has two main parts: 
- Part I presents the current status of AFIS technology, introducing key concepts such as 
accuracy and biometric quality and concluding with the main challenges faced in the design 
and deployment of AFIS functionality in a large-scale IT-system.  
- Part II analyses the current implementation of SIS-II and puts forward recommendations to 
address the challenges identified in Part I in order to successfully implement AFIS functionality 
in SIS-II in the most effective way possible. 
                                                          
1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0533&from=EN 
2 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:381:0004:0004:EN:PDF 
3 eu-LISA is the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. 
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Key conclusions 
For more than 35 years AFIS functionality has been intrinsically linked with databases supporting law 
enforcement and border management activities. According to its general purpose, SIS-II constitutes 
one of those databases and therefore SIS-II alerts related to persons will not deliver their full capacity 
and usefulness without the support of an Automatic Fingerprint Identification System.  
AFIS technology has reached sufficient levels of readiness and availability for its integration into SIS-II, 
provided that all recommendations listed in the present report are implemented and respected during 
the rollout and utilization of the new functionality.  
 
The rollout of AFIS functionality should be preceded with the selection of the most appropriate special 
quality check tools (as required by Article 22(a)) and with the production of detailed statistics on 
consultations related to persons as carried out currently in SIS-II. 
Main findings and Recommendations  
The JRC has listed 19 recommendations to support successful deployment and use of an AFIS in SIS-
II. The recommendations cover the following topics: national expertise and best practice; selection 
of appropriate formats to collect, exchange and process data; production of statistics; identification 
of appropriate architecture options; application of rigorous procedures for biometric enrolment; 
selection of measures to foster quality; definition of use-case scenarios and introduction of regular 
performance evaluation actions.  
Related and future JRC work 
The JRC has already conducted a study on the quality of children’s fingerprints4. This work was based 
on a dataset provided via a collaboration with the Portuguese Authorities. An extension of this 
collaboration has given access to a much larger dataset which will allow the JRC to conduct further 
quality-related experiments on fingerprint quality comparison among significant age groups (i.e. 
children, adults, elderly), which could be of relevance for the future of SIS-II and in particular its AFIS. 
JRC will launch, in 2016, a competition on AFIS performance which could be adapted to the SIS-II 
context with the active support of the Member States and could provide useful results for future SIS-
II AFIS deployment.  
Quick guide 
A biometric system is essentially a pattern recognition system that makes use of biometric traits to 
recognize individuals. An AFIS is an automated identification biometric system which searches 
whether specific fingerprints are present in a large database of fingerprints. If the search is positive, 
the results will be the list of all possible individuals whose fingerprints match the specific fingerprints.  
  
                                                          
4  Fingerprint Recognition for Children (2013), DOI 10.2788/3086, EUR 26193 EN, 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC85145 
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List of recommendations 
RECOMMENDATION 1: Need for complementary statistics 
- We recommend that, following a consultation with the EDPS by the Commission, eu-LISA identifies 
the best possible ways to include in its statistic annual report the number of consultations per year 
related to persons. In order to complement this assessment at central level, we also recommend 
that Member States report annually on the number of consultations related to persons that have 
been carried out on their national copies and, whenever possible, on the context of these 
consultations (e.g. at the police office, at border check). 
RECOMMENDATION 2: Promotion of best practices 
- We recommend that the expertise acquired during the development and management of national 
AFIS is appropriately applied to the SIS-II AFIS deployment and that best practices identified at 
national level are further fostered. 
RECOMMENDATION 3: Common exchange standard 
- So far, NIST containers, as required by the SIRENE Manual and the best practice guide from Interpol, 
seem to provide an appropriate basis regarding the exchange of fingerprint data. We recommend 
that an automatic check for their mandatory and complete implementation should be developed in 
order to appropriately support the deployment of the SIS-II AFIS functionality. 
RECOMMENDATION 4: Prüm and SIS-II complementarity 
- A need for clarification between the functionalities of Prüm system and of a future SIS-II AFIS was 
strongly identified during the visits. We recommend that this need is addressed. 
RECOMMENDATION 5: Dedicated sub-systems 
- In order to better respect the different business cases envisaged for a SIS-II AFIS, we recommend to 
consider in the design of such a system the use of dedicated sub-systems for each category of query. 
RECOMMENDATION 6: High-quality enrolment process 
- We recommend that, whenever a data subject is available, that is, in most of the cases, the 
enrolment phase should favour the use of live-scan devices and be conducted under the control of 
experienced operators, as is usually the case in a law enforcement context. This should result in the 
production of a high-quality ten print card containing both rolled and flat data. 
RECOMMENDATION 7: Storage of multiple datasets 
- We recommend to envisage the storage of multiple datasets (e.g. four datasets) for a SIS-II AFIS to 
support a composite matching strategy. As long as it is clearly established that the datasets belong 
to a same person, a composite check would be the result of multiple datasets associated with a single 
alert or datasets belonging to several alerts, which should already benefit of links established in 
accordance with Article 52 of the SIS-II Decision. 
RECOMMENDATION 8: Controlled transfer of datasets 
- We recommend that SIS-II AFIS accepts fingerprint datasets produced via other systems, as long as 
the parameters of these systems are kept in the dataset included in the alert. NIST containers offer 
the possibility to keep several quality scores issued by different systems. 
RECOMMENDATION 9: Quality of capture points 
- Supervision by an operator. Adequate operator training is recommended, as supervision of 
biometric acquisition is a repetitive task and requires additional attention in the case of centralised 
enrolment stations. The aim is to avoid tiredness and boredom adversely affecting the process. 
- Adequate sensor. We recommend to use performant fingerprint sensors (e.g. in size and resolution), 
offering also enhanced capabilities to acquire low-quality sources. Whenever possible live-scan 
devices should be favoured for capturing fingerprints. 
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- Enhanced graphic user interface (GUI). We recommend that capture points have large displays and 
provide real-time feedback of acquired data. 
- Proper user interaction. The enrolment process should be user-friendly with clear procedures which 
are properly explained. The use of good ergonomics should support better acquisition practices. 
- Adequate environment. The acquisition environment should be appropriate in terms of 
illumination, temperature and backgrounds both for the subject and the operator. These elements 
are recommended mainly for fixed stations but similar considerations are instrumental as well for 
mobile stations. 
- Sensor maintenance. There should be regular and systematic cleaning of the enrolment stations to 
avoid “ghost fingerprint” effect, especially in the case of consultation processes taking place in 
heavily used check points. 
RECOMMENDATION 10: Quality assessment algorithms 
- Adherence to standards. We recommend to include in a SIS-II AFIS the results of the quality metrics 
algorithm used locally by Member States as well as the results of the use of standard quality metrics 
such as NFIQ and NFIQ-II. These two results will complement those provided by the quality metrics 
algorithm of the SIS-II Central AFIS functionality. All three results can be added in a single NIST 
container, as for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000 standard (see Recommendation 3 above). 
- Corrective actions. We recommend to implement an acquisition loop/recapture procedure to be 
carried out until satisfactory quality prints have been obtained. This procedure should contemplate 
alternative acquisition processes, according to the sample quality, and should include human 
intervention, where appropriate. 
RECOMMENDATION 11: Quality of identification systems 
- Quality-based processing. In addition to the standard algorithms and tools used for fingerprint 
identification, we recommend the use of supplementary tools such as alternative feature extraction 
functions and process-specific matching algorithms. 
- Quality based fusion. We recommend to combine different samples so as to be able to conduct 
composite checks. Should the revision of the SIS legislation allow this option at a later stage, it would 
be interesting to combine different biometric traits (e.g. multimodal biometric matching system) to 
improve identification results. 
- Template substitution/update. When generating templates for an AFIS, we recommend to select 
best stored samples. 
- Monitoring. We recommend to produce statistics for each type of applications, sites, devices, and 
operators, so as to obtain a user-scanner learning curve and propose training measures, as needed. 
RECOMMENDATION 12: Children cases 
- The majority of alerts on missing persons are related to minors. We recommend that a SIS-II AFIS 
includes the possibility to tune the matching process towards such cases, in particular, when 
fingerprint data in the alert are more than two years old. 
RECOMMENDATION 13: Quality check central service 
- We recommend that an automated central service is offered to Member States to check fingerprint 
quality against the SIS-II AFIS quality metrics. A similar service exists already for the VIS with a 
response time of less than 30 seconds. Such a system would provide a significant additional feedback 
to the operator on the quality of the fingerprint dataset being acquired. 
RECOMMENDATION 14: Reporting on lower quality fingerprint card 
- We recommend to record when a dataset, which is proposed for enrolment or for addition in an 
alert, has not the quality level required for the SIS-II AFIS either in an alert or in the dataset card 
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itself. Such a record would take place, for instance, when a ten print card is produced from a system 
that acquires flat prints only (e.g. the VIS). 
RECOMMENDATION 15: Integrity of the database 
- We recommend the use of best practices to reduce the risk of inconsistency or erroneous data, 
including fingerprints, recorded in the database. Efficient methods should be designed to find, 
mitigate, correct or prevent the occurrence of such issues. These methods are of organizational and 
technical nature. As an example, during a two print consultation, a cross-check should be conducted 
on the two fingers. In case of a match between a left index and a right index stored in the AFIS, a 
message should be sent to the Member States which has introduced the alert. 
RECOMMENDATION 16: Consultation 
- Enhanced resolution (1000dpi). We recommend to give the possibility to store fingerprints at a 
1000dpi resolution to those Member States that have already upgraded their scanners at that 
resolution. 
- Flat and rolled fingerprints. We recommend that Member States should be allowed, for consultation 
only, to limit fingerprint collection only to flat prints. Member States have already implemented this 
option at national level since it is a faster method compared to using both flat and rolled data. 
- Two prints fast check. We recommend to offer the possibility to carry out quick consultations. Such 
quick consultations are required in situations such as first line border control or on-the-spot street 
checks. The result of these consultations should be a hit/no hit reply which can trigger, in case of a 
hit, a second line control check. 
RECOMMENDATION 17: Appropriate response times 
- We recommend that the SIS-II AFIS complies with the following three response times, which are at 
this stage only indicative and tend to reflect the discussion which took place with Member States: 
(a) A very short response time (i.e. below 30 seconds) should be expected from a first line of border 
control check or a mobile check by a field law enforcement officer. (b) A medium response time (i.e. 
below five minutes) should be expected from a second line control check at the border or at a 
consular post (e.g. in the course of a VISA application). (c) A longer response time (i.e. up to ten 
minutes) could be tolerated for law enforcement consultations taking place at a police station, 
especially in the case of latents. 
RECOMMENDATION 18: Queries priority 
- We recommend the definition of priority levels for processing queries in order for a SIS-II AFIS to 
manage better the workload of the system. 
RECOMMENDATION 19: Performance benchmark 
- Considering that carrying out an in-depth performance evaluation is time and resource consuming, 
we recommend that such evaluations are planned already in the development phase of a SIS-II AFIS 
and are performed at the time of its rollout, as well as, every four years or every time a major update 
of the matching system is installed, whichever comes first. 
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1 Introduction  
In September 2014, DG HOME and the JRC agreed on Administrative Arrangement JRC 33516-2014 
NFP aiming to study the readiness and availability of Automatic Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS) technologies for their introduction in the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS-
II).  
AFIS technology has been ready and available for many years and, as will be described later in the 
study, it has been implemented and used in numerous databases. However, the level of readiness and 
availability have to be assessed in the context of the unique situation and characteristics of SIS-II which 
present a series of technical and organisational challenges requiring appropriate and customised 
solutions. 
The objective of this JRC study is therefore to provide a report supporting the decision-making process 
on whether fingerprint identification technology is mature enough for inclusion in SIS-II. This report 
presents the main findings of the JRC study together with options and recommendations for successful 
implementation of this AFIS functionality. The operational implementation of such functionality will 
require an additional dedicated study providing the detailed specifications emanating from the 
recommendations and options selected from the JRC study. In Annex 1 a series of technological 
concepts and definitions related to AFIS is provided in order to facilitate the reader’s task.  
1.1 Policy, technical and legal contexts of SIS-II  
The second generation Schengen Information System (SIS-II) entered into operation on 9 April 2013. 
Its original version, SIS-I was the first so-called large-scale IT system launched by the EU Member 
States in 1995 and was followed by EURODAC (asylum seekers’ database) in 2003 and the Visa 
Information System (VIS) in 2011. Created as a compensatory measure for the abolition of internal 
border checks within the Schengen area, SIS was established with two intentions: to contribute to law 
enforcement cooperation between the Member States and to support external border control.  
SIS-II enables competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on 
certain categories of wanted or missing persons and objects. A SIS-II alert not only contains 
information about a particular person or object but also clear instructions on what to do when the 
person or object has been found. Among the 61 million of alerts stored in SIS-II, 1.43% are related to 
persons (around 800 000). An alert always consists of three parts: firstly a set of data for identifying 
the person or object in the alert, secondly a statement why the person or object is sought and thirdly 
an instruction on the action to be taken when the person or object has been found. 
The quality, accuracy and completeness of the data elements enabling identification are the key 
conditions for the success of SIS-II. For alerts on persons the minimum data-set is name, sex, a 
reference to the decision giving rise to the alert, and the action to be taken. When available, 
photographs and fingerprints must be added in order to both facilitate identification and avoid mis-
identification.  
SIS-II consists of three major components: a central system, national systems which may contain a 
synchronised copy of the data in the central system, and a communication infrastructure (network) 
between the central system and the national systems. An alert which is entered in SIS-II in one 
Member State is transferred in real time to the central system. It then becomes available so that 
authorised users can carry out queries in the database by entering search data on persons and objects. 
A detailed description of SIS-II and the five types of alert related to persons which can be created is 
available in Section 7 of this report.  
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In the case of alerts related to persons, SIS-II offers the possibility to process biometric data, as is 
already the case with EURODAC and the VIS. It is foreseen according to Articles 22(c) of SIS-II Decision5 
and Regulation6 that SIS-II may also be used to identify a person on the basis of his/her fingerprints, a 
functionality which will require the implementation of an Automatic Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS) “once it becomes technically possible” and when the Commission has presented “a report on 
the availability and readiness of the required technology on which the European Parliament is 
consulted”.  
According to Article 22.b of the SIS-II legal framework, currently, fingerprints and photographs can be 
used only to confirm and verify the identity of a person who has initially been identified on the basis 
of alphanumeric data (e.g. name and date of birth). When attached to the alert concerning the person, 
these biometric data are manually processed in order to conduct an identity verification.  
These biometric data can be added to alerts only after a quality check as required by Article 22(a). This 
quality check should be defined through a comitology procedure. The SIRENE Manual annexed to a 
Commission Decision7 describes the way these data should be attached to an alert. The Manual 
contains detailed rules for the exchange of supplementary information. Supplementary information 
is information not stored in SIS-II but connected to SIS-II alerts, which is to be exchanged between 
Member States.  
In addition to the centralised large-scale IT systems, EU Member States have developed, under the 
umbrella of the Prüm Treaty8 and later in the context of the Decision 2008/615/JHA9, the possibility 
to query national criminal AFIS. The Decision provides for the automated exchange of DNA, 
fingerprints and vehicle registration data, as well as other forms of police cooperation between the 
27 EU States. A brief comparison between the Prüm mechanism and SIS-II can be found in Annex 2. 
The Prüm mechanism was not initially identified as part of the policy context of the study but it has 
been highlighted and discussed by the Member States visited.  
1.2 Technology: readiness and availability 
According to the Horizon 2020 EU Research and Innovation Framework Programme the readiness and 
availability of a given technology is assessed using nine different levels (Technology Readiness Levels, 
TRL): 
- TRL 1 – basic principles observed, 
- TRL 2 – technology concept formulated, 
- TRL 3 – experimental proof of concept, 
- TRL 4 – technology validated in laboratory, 
- TRL 5 – technology validated in relevant environment (industrially relevant environment in 
the case of key enabling technologies), 
- TRL 6 – technology demonstrated in relevant environment (industrially relevant 
environment in the case of key enabling technologies),  
- TRL 7 – system prototype demonstration in operational environment,  
- TRL 8 – system complete and qualified, 
- TRL 9 – actual system proven in operational environment. 
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As will be explained in this report, although AFIS technology has reached TRL 910, with multiple large-
scale systems already deployed and working worldwide, each operational scenario has its own 
specificities. As such, the successful application of a certain technology to a given specific use-case 
and environment, does not necessarily guarantee the same level of success when those operational 
conditions are changed. 
In particular, for AFIS technology to achieve the expected level of performance, there are certain 
parameters that have to be taken into account. Probably, the most important of these features is the 
accuracy that can be expected from AFIS. Unfortunately, the answer to the question of how accurate 
current systems are is not straightforward, as it largely depends on the data (i.e. fingerprint samples) 
a system will have to deal with and, more particularly, with the quality of that data. Furthermore, 
depending on the use-cases defined for such AFIS, a different level of accuracy may be acceptable 
and/or expected. 
This report describes current AFIS technology and clearly states the challenges faced by this type of 
system, giving a series of recommendations on how to best face these challenges so that the outcome 
of the eventual integration of AFIS technology in SIS-II is successful. 
1.3 Methodology followed for conducting the study  
The study was conceived as a three step task with some slight overlap between the steps:  
- STEP 1: Wide collection of information regarding AFIS technology. 
- STEP 2: Synthesis of the information obtained from multiple sources. 
- STEP 3: Producing the report. 
STEP 1 was the most important and, as such, the most time and resource consuming. This step 
provided all the necessary information for the JRC analysis and eventually led to the current report. 
This information was collected over five phases, each of them involving different sources. These 
phases are detailed in the next sections. 
1.3.1 Phase 1: Analysis of the state of the art in AFIS technology 
Relevant bibliography and scientific literature were extensively reviewed in order to consolidate and 
complement JRC knowledge and obtain an initial solid overview of the main features and challenges 
of AFIS. Such a study of the AFIS field was necessary in order to prepare the set of visits and 
consultations carried out in the next phases. 
1.3.2 Phase 2: Consultation with national AFIS 
The final users of a future AFIS in SIS-II will be the competent authorities of the different Member 
States (MS), such as police and border guards. During the design process of such an AFIS, it is therefore 
extremely important to know the operational contexts in which MS are using their national AFIS, the 
similarities and differences between them, as well as their needs. 
Following the rationale described above and in order to address the objective of assessing “the 
availability and readiness of the required technology“ for the inclusion of an AFIS in SIS-II, the JRC first 
contacted and visited nine EU Schengen Member States’ law enforcement entities (France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Finland). The objectives of these exchanges 
were threefold: 
- Learn which technologies these countries have implemented in order to operate a national 
AFIS;  
                                                          
10 Similar classification and approach can also be found in the report “Best Practices in Testing and Reporting 
Performance of Biometric Devices” by Wayman and Mansfield from 2002. 
http://www.kisa.or.kr/jsp/common/downloadAction.jsp?bno=59&dno=9&fseq=1  
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- Identify which best organisational and procedural techniques they have developed;  
- Describe the remaining challenges they face.  
These visits also led to better understanding of how and in which cases Member States are already 
using their national AFIS, SIS-II or any other AFIS (e.f, EURODAC, Prüm, Interpol). The visits also gave 
an opportunity for the JRC to collect the possible expectations those authorities might have regarding 
the introduction of AFIS functionality in SIS-II. 
The visits to the nine MS were complemented with a visit to the United States of America, the host of 
some of the biggest and most advanced AFIS, presenting broad similarities with the objectives and 
expected use of the SIS-II AFIS. 
With the support of DG HOME, the JRC first sent an introductory letter to the targeted countries asking 
for a possible visit to their National AFIS and presenting the overall objectives of the study. All 
countries replied positively to the JRC letter, provided the technical contact for the visit and actively 
cooperated in its organisation.  
Those visits were also facilitated by the preparatory work done by DG HOME during the SISVIS 
committee meetings during 2014 and the preliminary questionnaires related to the possibility of 
introducing AFIS submitted to the members of this committee.  
An outline of the envisaged technical exchange was sent to the countries prior to the visit (see annex 
3). This outline aimed to inform them by providing a list of preliminary questions regarding the 
different technical fields the JRC wished to explore during the visit. Each visit focused on the following 
subjects:  
- The use-cases in which fingerprints are processed;  
- A technical description of the national AFIS; 
- The management of the life cycle of fingerprint data in their system; 
- The possibility to have a live demonstration of the use of the AFIS.  
The JRC visits targeted national AFIS used in the context of criminal matters and managed by national 
police forces. However, for each visit, authorities in charge of border management (also using the 
national AFIS) were included and participated in the presentations and discussion.  
At the beginning of each visit, the JRC gave an introduction and proposed an agenda divided into three 
main steps:  
- The National AFIS; 
- Current and future uses of SIS-II; 
- Use of other EU/international system such as Prüm, INTERPOL, etc. 
The visits were conducted by two JRC scientific officers. This team of two was necessary to cope with 
the very rich and intensive discussion offered by the visited countries.  
At the end of each visit, the JRC provided the timescale of the study and invited participants to review 
the final draft of the present report. The timeline and most relevant information concerning the visits 
are summarized in Table 1. Summary of the key information concerning the visits to the institutions 
managing the national AFIS in different countries. 
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COUNTRY DATE INSTITUTION COMMENTS 
Finland 3/12/2014 National Police Board Other institutions represented: 
National Bureau of Investigation 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of the Interior 
Austria 16/12/2014 Criminal Intelligence 
Service Austria 
 
Portugal 13/01/2015 Laboratorio de Policia 
Cientifica 
 
Romania 03/02/2015 National Police Forensic 
Institute 
 
Netherlands 10/02/2015 National Police Forensic 
Service 
Other institutions represented: 
Ministry of Defence 
Spain 16/02/2015 Policia Nacional Policia 
Cientifica 
Other institutions represented: 
Ministerio de Interior 




Italy 31/03/2015 Polizia di Stato  
United States 09-13/03/2015 US National Institute for 
Standards and 
Technology (NIST) 
Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
Department of 
Homeland Security – 
Office of Biometric 
Identity Management 
 
Germany 22/07/2015 Federal Criminal Police 
Office Wiesbaden 
ZD 23 - AFIS 
Conference-call 
Table 1. Summary of the key information concerning the visits to the institutions managing the 
national AFIS in different countries. 
1.3.3 Phase 3: Consultation with eu-LISA 
The visit on 19 January 2015 to the European Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale 
IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) allowed the JRC to obtain an accurate 
picture of the central part of the EU AFIS already in production such as the Visa Information System 
(VIS) and EURODAC. It also provided a detailed description of the SIS-II central system and its reporting 
capability. This visit was followed by a series of exchanges and conference calls with the officers 
respectively in charge of SIS-II, VIS and EURODAC until the end of the study, providing the latest up-
to-date statistics of those systems when available.  
1.3.4 Phase 4: Consultation with AFIS vendors 
The information collected from authorities already using AFIS was completed by discussions with the 
vendors of such technology. This also allowed the JRC to have a better understanding of the 
deployment challenges faced by the actual designers of such systems. 
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Although numerous companies offer AFIS in multiple domains, most of them are integrators and do 
not themselves develop AFIS solutions. In the light of the discussions with the nine national authorities 
visited, Morpho11 and 3M12, which provided AFIS to those authorities, were consulted.  
1.3.5 Phase 5: Consultation with external review board of experts 
In order to review the results and conclusions established in this report, an External Review Board 
comprised of Davide Maltoni (IT), Olaf Henniger (DE), Julian Fierrez (ES), Didier Meuwly (NL) and 
Christophe Champod (CH) was set-up. An introductory meeting was organised at the end of April 2015. 
The final draft version of the report was then submitted to them at the end of July 2015. The five 
experts presented their review, comments and suggestions in the course of a meeting held in Ispra on 
26 and 27 of August 2015.  
1.4 Structure of the report 
The methodological approach adopted by the JRC for the analysis was to explore and assess the main 
characteristics and challenges of AFIS in general and then apply these identified elements to the 
specific context of SIS-II and suggest recommendations to appropriately address them. Accordingly, 
the JRC report contains two main parts: 
- PART I sets the scene on the current status of AFIS technology. It introduces the key 
parameters that define the readiness of a given technology, such as its performance. This part 
also presents some general concepts regarding the quality of the data which is a factor that 
has a key impact on the performance of AFIS. The reader will also find in this part a summary 
of the main characteristics of some of the most important large-scale AFIS already working 
worldwide, as well as a summary of the key features of an AFIS. 
As a wrap-up, PART I finishes with a section dedicated to the main challenges faced by AFIS 
designers when putting in place such new large-scale systems. All these challenges have been 
extracted from the large amount of information provided by the different sources consulted 
during the preparatory stages of the report (i.e. bibliography, Member States, vendors, eu-
LISA, and external experts’ board). 
- PART II focuses first on SIS-II as it is implemented today, presenting some facts related to 
different statistics concerning the system such as the number of alerts, the actual size of the 
database, number of queries, current architecture, expected use-cases or relevant legislation. 
After this initial presentation of the system, PART II builds on the initial scene, concepts and 
key features for the AFIS technology introduced in PART I and on the specificities of SIS-II, to 
give a series of recommendations, suggestions and options on how each of the challenges 
presented at the end of PART I could be potentially dealt with in the case of SIS-II in order to 
successfully implement an AFIS functionality in the most effective way possible. 
PART II finishes with a more prospective look into the future giving some possible actions (still 
not contemplated by the current legislation) that could be undertaken in the years to come in 
order to further improve the accuracy, flexibility and ultimately the added-value offered by 
SIS-II to the Member States. 
1.5 Audience of the report 
Although the report has been conceived as a self-contained document to be read by a wide general 
audience, technical terms and aspects related to biometric technology are discussed in the different 
sections. Therefore, for those readers who are laymen in biometrics, it is strongly recommended to 
first read the final annexes (and references therein) where some basic technical concepts are 
                                                          
11 http://www.morpho.com/  
12 http://solutions.3m.com/wps/portal/3M/en_US/Security/Identity_Management/  
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introduced. This initial reading can facilitate a better grasp of the implications and findings of the 
report. 
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PART I: OVERVIEW OF AFIS TECHNOLOGY 
As already mentioned in Section 1.2, one of the most important features, if not the most important 
one, that defines the readiness and availability of AFIS, is accuracy. This accuracy is deeply impacted 
by the quality of the data (i.e. fingerprint impressions) that the AFIS has to deal with. In addition, both 
performance and quality depend on the different use-cases in which the AFIS will be deployed and 
used.  
PART I of this report is structured according to these three key aspects: accuracy, quality and use-
cases. First, some general notes about AFIS performance evaluation are provided. Second, the concept 
of biometric quality and its impact on the performance of biometric systems is introduced focusing 
always on the fingerprint biometric trait. Third, we present different use-cases in which AFIS are 
utilized by the end-users of a potential SIS-II AFIS (i.e. national police forces of the different MS), 
together with the most significant operational differences observed during our visits to the Member 
States. Fourth, we describe some of the large-scale IT systems already in production today.  
In the final section of PART I, we list and summarise the main challenges faced by current AFIS 
technology which have to be taken into account when considering the introduction of such 
functionality in a new large-scale system. 
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2 AFIS Accuracy Evaluation 
Considered as the main pillar for determining the readiness and availability of AFIS technology, 
accuracy constitutes the main focus of the present section. This dimension is tackled through an 
analysis of the key aspects to be taken into account for the assessment of error rates and a review of 
the most significant independent evaluation campaigns conducted so far.  
Although the most important, accuracy represents only one of the parameters which determine the 
performance of an AFIS. Other performance parameters that are not considered in this section (or 
only from a very general perspective) are for example: matching speed, computational efficiency and 
response time or template size. 
Objective accuracy evaluation of biometric systems is not a straightforward task. In an ideal situation, 
one would like to assess the application-independent accuracy of a recognition system and be able to 
predict its real operational accuracy in any context. In this ideal scenario, rigorous and realistic 
modelling techniques simulating data acquisition and matching processes are the only way to obtain 
and extrapolate the accuracy evaluation results. More research effort is still required to further 
address this problem.  
In the meantime, performing comparative evaluations on specific scenarios is the norm. Until many 
aspects of biometric recognition algorithms and application requirements are clearly understood, 
comparative, empirical, application-dependent evaluation techniques will be predominant and the 
evaluation results obtained using these techniques will be meaningful mainly for a specific database 
in a specific test environment and a specific application. Another disadvantage of empirical evaluation 
is that it is expensive to collect the data for each evaluation, complement them with the ground truth 
metadata and implement additional data protection measures so as to fulfil the obligations related to 
this new purpose. It has to be highlighted that objectively comparing the evaluation results of two 
different systems, tested under different conditions, presents limitations in the relevance of the 
comparison.  
Depending upon the data collection protocol, the accuracy results can vary significantly from one 
benchmark to another. Within the biometric recognition context, a benchmark is defined by a 
database and an associated testing protocol. Generally the protocol defines (at least) the subsets of 
images that can be used for training and testing, the pair of images that have to be compared, the 
performance metrics to be used and how they must be computed. 
Below, a summary of the most important independent evaluation campaigns that have been 
performed in fingerprint recognition will be presented. It is important to note that, as pointed out 
above, any effort to assess the general performance of any biometric system in verification or 
identification transactions must be undertaken with care. The accuracy and overall performance of 
any method or system will depend on multiple factors which are difficult to model or to objectively 
quantify, including the quality of data input (and hence the sensor and feature extraction algorithms), 
the specific matching algorithms used, the population being assessed and in the case of identification 
from a database, the number of entries to be searched. Thus, the results presented in this section 
should be assessed with these caveats as they are valid only for the use-cases and situations in which 
the testing described was carried out. Performance expectations in other scenarios based on these 
results cannot simply be assumed. 
Bearing in mind the previous caution, the results obtained in a performance evaluation can be useful 
for environments similar to the one envisaged by the data used and, if properly analysed, they can 
reveal important factors to consider in other environments (and most importantly: how to consider 
such effects). What is important to emphasize is that, in those cases where the scenario under study 
is not identical to the one defined in a benchmark, the results previously obtained in that benchmark 
should be carefully interpreted and probably adapted, e.g. previous FVC and NIST evaluations disclose 
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very important information to be considered as a basis for the proposed development of an AFIS in 
SIS-II (a basis that can be fine-tuned with specific and more targeted benchmarks using real SIS-II data).  
Therefore, the series of evaluations presented below, can help to provide an overall picture not only 
of the evolution of the state of the art over the last 15 years but also on the performance capabilities 
of fingerprint recognition systems today. The most significant independent evaluation campaigns that 
have been carried out so far in fingerprint recognition are:  
- the two NIST Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluations: FpVTE 2003 and FpVTE 2012, 
- the NIST Evaluation of Latent Fingerprints Technologies (ELFT), which has had different phases 
between 2007 and 2012, 
- the NIST Proprietary Fingerprint Template Evaluation (PFT) which has had two phases, one 
from 2003-2010 and a second which started in 2010 and is still ongoing, 
- the NIST Minex initiative which has had different stages between 2004 and 2015, 
- the five Fingerprint Verification Competitions (FVC), which took place in 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006 and the continuing over time FVC-OnGoing. 
All these initiatives will be briefly described in the following sections. Those that are most relevant to 
the SIS-II are the NIST FpVTE and the NIST ELFT, as they assess the accuracy of AFIS, while the rest deal 
with the accuracy of fingerprint verification systems (for a clarification on the differences between 
biometric systems working on “identification” and “verification” we refer the reader to Annex 1). 
In particular, the closest evaluation to the SIS-II system, both in terms of type of fingerprint data and 
size of the database, is the NIST FpVTE 2012. Even if results cannot be directly extrapolated, this 
evaluation can be considered as a good estimation of the accuracy that can be expected from AFIS 
technology in the SIS-II operational environment. 
The two most relevant metrics used in these evaluations to assess performance were: 
- False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR): FPIR is the fraction of the non-mated searches (i.e. 
searches of an identity that is not in the database), where one or more enrolled identities are 
returned at or above a certain threshold. 
- False Negative Identification Rate (FNIR): FNIR is the fraction of the mated searches (i.e. 
searches of an identity that does exist in the database), where the enrolled mate is outside 
the ranked list of identities returned by the system or that the comparison score is below a 
given threshold. 
For further details on these and other metrics used to evaluate the accuracy of AFIS, the reader is 
referred to Annex 1. Also, please refer to Annex 1 for further details on terms such as: ten print 
searches, latent fingerprints, live-scanned/inked fingerprints, flat/rolled fingerprints. 
2.1 NIST Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluations (FpVTE) 2003 and 
2012 
Following the path started by the successful Fingerprint Verification Competitions (FVC) organized by 
the University of Bologna for the first time in 2000, in 2003 NIST conducted the first Fingerprint Vendor 
Technology Evaluation (FpVTE): an independently administered technology evaluation of fingerprint 
matching, identification, and verification systems. 
FpVTE 2003 was designed to assess the capability of fingerprint systems to meet requirements for 
both large-scale and small-scale real world applications. FpVTE 2003 consisted of multiple tests 
performed with combinations of fingers (e.g. single fingers, two index fingers, four to ten fingers) and 
different types and qualities of operational fingerprints such as flat live-scan images from visa 
applicants, multi finger slap live-scan images from present-day booking or background check systems 
or rolled and flat inked fingerprints from legacy criminal databases). 
  20 
 
The contest was entered by 18 different private biometric companies including some of the biggest 
players at international level such as Morpho or 3M-Cogent. A detailed description of the competition 
together with all the results may be found in [NIST2004]. 
In 2012, NIST launched a new Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation (FpVTE) with two main goals. 
The first was to assess the current capabilities of matching algorithms using operational datasets with 
several million subjects. The second was to evaluate different operational considerations that could 
impact matching accuracy. These considerations included number of fingers used, data types (live-
scan, single finger capture, slap capture requiring segmentation and rolled), number of enrolled 
subjects and matching speeds.  
As in the previous contest, all the main vendors in the fingerprint recognition field at international 
level took part in the competition. This is, so far, the latest fingerprint technology evaluation carried 
out and therefore, the one that can give a clearer picture of current AFIS capabilities. As such, a brief 
summary of the results obtained in the competition is given in Table 2 Result of the best performing 
algorithm in the tasks of: single index identification, 2-indexes identification and ten finger 
identification. where the size of the search database N is given in parenthesis as one of the critical 
parameters in the evaluation of AFIS accuracy [Jarosz2005]. For a full description of all the scenarios 
considered in the competition and a detailed analysis of the results we refer the reader to [NIST2014]. 
 1-index ident. 2-index ident. 10-finger ident. 






Table 2 Result of the best performing algorithm in the tasks of: single index identification, 2-indexes 
identification and ten finger identification.  
The figures show the False Negative Identification Rate (FNIR) at a False Positive Identification Rate of 
0.1%. N indicates the size of the search database which is a critical factor in AFIS accuracy assessment. 
For further details on the evaluation protocol used we refer the reader to [NIST2014]. The definitions 
of FNIR and FPIR as well as other relevant information regarding AFIS accuracy assessment can be 
found in Annex 1. 
2.2 NIST Evaluation of Latent Fingerprints Technologies (ELFT) 
The ELFT initiative started in 2006 with the organization by NIST of a preliminary workshop. The main 
findings can be consulted in [NIST2006]. The workshop led, in 2007, to the organization of the first 
ELFT evaluation, which aimed to assess the core capabilities of current automatic latent matching 
algorithms. The evaluation consisted of two tests, run in a “lights-out” environment. “Lights-out” 
refers to a fully automatic scenario with no human intervention. The two tests were termed Phase I 
and II. Phase I was a proof of concept test, the main purpose of which was to demonstrate integrity 
of the software in a lights-out environment. During Phase I the software would demonstrate: 1) 
automated feature extraction from latent images; 2) the ability to match these features against 
enrolled ten print backgrounds and 3) generation of candidate lists. Phase II then employed a larger 
database to quantify the achievable performance for automated searches.  
All the tests and results carried out in Phase II are detailed in [NIST2009], where the best performing 
algorithm over 500 dpi images obtained a Rank 1 accuracy of 96.4% and a Rank 10 accuracy of 97.2% 
over a search database of N=100.000 identities. 
The ELFT initiative continued in 2009 with the organization of a second workshop and with the 
announcement of a second evaluation in a “semi lights-out” environment, that is, where some human 
intervention is allowed but the final identification task is fully automatic. The main purpose of the 
evaluation was to assess the accuracy of latent matching using features marked by experienced 
human latent fingerprint examiners. A key result of the test was to determine when human minutiae 
mark-up is effective. As human mark-up is expensive in terms of time, effort and expertise, there is a 
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need to know when image-only searching is adequate and when the additional effort of marking 
minutiae and extended features (e.g. sweat pores, core, delta) is appropriate. 
The final report of this second 2009 ELFT evaluation was published in [NIST2011]. Unfortunately the 
data used in 2006 ELFT-Phase II and that used in 2009 ELFT-Extended Feature Sets were totally 
different and therefore the results are not comparable. In the 2009 human-aided evaluation, the Rank 
1 accuracy of the best system was 62.2% over a search database of N=100.000 identities (see Annex 
1 for a complete definition of Rank 1 accuracy). 
Additionally, continuing this line of latent performance evaluation, in 2013 NIST made public a 
presentation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which gives selected statistics on State and 
Federal Agency latent fingerprint searches. The document also discusses methods for improving 
performance (individualization) for latent searches and covers steps toward greater automation in the 
future, such as increased reliance on image-only searches [FBI2013]. 
2.3 NIST Proprietary Fingerprint Template Evaluation (PFT) 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology's Proprietary Fingerprint Template evaluation is 
an ongoing program to measure the performance of fingerprint matching software by utilizing vendor 
proprietary fingerprint templates. There have been two phases to the PFT evaluation: 
- The original PFT evaluation (which is no longer accepting SDKs for evaluation and which ran 
between 2003 and 2010) which only reported the matching algorithm's accuracy. Most of the 
results of this initial phase are reported in [NIST2005]. 
- The newer PFTII evaluation (which is currently accepting SDKs for evaluation) also reports 
matcher accuracy information and, in addition, will also report on other useful information 
such as template extraction times, template size information and matcher timings. PFTII will 
use both two finger and ten finger datasets to report results on slap-to-slap, slap-to-roll, and 
roll-to-roll matching. PFTII continues to be only a one-to-one verification evaluation, it does 
not report one-to-many matching results (if needed, see Annex 1 for a detailed description 
between “one-to-one” and “one-to-many” matching). 
These evaluations are intended to assess the core algorithmic capability of the technology to perform 
one-to-one verification. These evaluations assess the accuracy of end-stage matchers, that is, the 
computationally expensive algorithms used in the very last stages of one-to-many AFIS searches. This 
evaluation is not necessarily representative of a provider's capability to field large-scale identification 
technologies, because AFIS engineering requires trade-offs between efficiency, cost, accuracy and 
other resources, and usually exploits multi-stage matching techniques to expedite search. As such, 
high accuracy from these evaluations does not automatically imply that a provider has the capability 
to provide a full-scale AFIS installation. 
2.4 NIST Minutiae Exchange (MINEX) 
The approval of the International Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) 378 
fingerprint template standard created the possibility of a fully inter-operable multi-vendor 
marketplace. As a result of this standard, NIST launched, in 2004, the MINEX evaluation. The purpose 
of the "Minutiae Interoperability Exchange Test (MINEX 04)" was to determine the feasibility of using 
minutiae data (rather than image data) as the interchange medium for fingerprint information 
between different fingerprint matching systems. MINEX 04 was designed to evaluate whether various 
populations and combinations of encoding schemes, probe templates, gallery templates, and 
fingerprint matchers will produce successful matches. In summary, the MINEX initiative was created 
to answer three main objectives: 1) Determine if standard templates give an accuracy comparable 
with proprietary (image-based) implementations. 2) Determine if template data can be generated and 
matched by different vendors without an attendant increase in error rates. 3) Establish compliance 
for template encoders and matchers for the United States Government's Personal Identity Verification 
(PIV) program.  
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Therefore, in this case the test was not designed to rank vendors but to determine whether various 
populations and combinations of encoding schemes, probe templates, gallery templates, and 
fingerprint matchers will produce successful matches. Each system participating was also required to 
produce minutiae templates in accordance with their proprietary encoding scheme. This provided a 
base performance level. 
The experimental protocol, tests and results of MINEX 04 are thoroughly described in [NIST2006b]. 
Contrary to the two previous evaluation campaigns described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, in this case the 
performance assessment was conducted for a verification scenario and not for identification. The 
results showed a clear performance loss between the three cases considered: 1) Proprietary template: 
vendor A performs recognition using its own proprietary templates. 2) Standard templates: vendor A 
performs recognition using its own extracted standard templates. 3) Interoperability: vendor A 
performs recognition using its matcher with the standard templates extracted by vendor B.  
The results for the best performing system in the three scenarios are summarized in Table 3. In this 
case results are given in terms of the False Match Rate (FMR) and False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) which 
are accuracy metrics applied to the assessment of verification systems and not of AFIS. The two 
metrics may be defined as follows: 
- False Match Rate (FMR): is the fraction of comparisons between samples of different 
individuals which are wrongly mated together. 
- False Non-Match Rate (FNMR): is the fraction of comparisons between samples of the same 
individual which are wrongly non-mated. 
 Proprietary template Standard template Interoperability 
FNMR @ FMR=1% 0.47% 1.29% 3.08% 
Table 3. Results of the best performing algorithm in MINEX 04 for the three considered scenarios. The 
figures represent the False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) at a False Match Rate (FMR) of 1%. 
The MINEX program has its continuation with the MINEX-III test which pursues the same objectives as 
the original MINEX 04 evaluation. The algorithm submission period opened in June 2015. 
The MINEX program was also extended in 2007 to the Match on Card technology with the MINEX-II 
initiative. The MINEX-II trials were conducted to evaluate the accuracy and speed of Match on Card 
verification algorithms that run on ISO/IEC 7816 smartcards. MINEX-II compared reference and 
verification data conforming to the ISO/IEC 19794-2 COMPACT CARD fingerprint minutia standard. 
The test was an assessment of the core viability of matching fingerprints (i.e. the de facto leading 
compact biometric data element) on personal identity credentials based on the industry-standard 
smart cards. The results are relevant to users of minutia templates as additional authentication factors 
and are collected in [NIST2011b]. This initiative is cited here for the sake of completeness, although it 
is less relevant to the SIS-II than the previous ones as the use of smart cards is not foreseen in the 
context of SIS-II. 
2.5 Fingerprint Verification Competitions 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 
OnGoing (FVC) 
The series of Fingerprint Verification Competitions (FVC) organized by the Università di Bologna, 
started in the year 2000 as the first effort to independently evaluate, in a comparable framework, 
different fingerprint recognition systems. Before the FVC 2000 initiative, only a few benchmarks had 
been available for comparing developments in this area and developers usually performed internal 
tests in self-collected databases. Also, the lack of standards at that time had unavoidably led to the 
dissemination of confusing, incomparable and irreproducible results, sometimes embedded in 
research papers and sometimes enriching the commercial claims of marketing brochures. 
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The aim of the FVC initiative was to take the first steps towards the establishment of a common basis, 
both for academia and industry, to better understand the state-of-the-art and to have a clearer view 
as how to improve this technology in the future. The competitions were always presented as an effort 
to get a clearer picture of fingerprint technology capabilities in terms of accuracy but not as a 
performance certification of the systems due to the following points: 
- The databases used in the contests were not acquired in a real environment. 
- Only parts of the participants’ software are evaluated by using images from sensors not native 
to each system. In fact, fingerprint-based biometric systems often implement proprietary 
solutions to improve robustness and accuracy (e.g. quality control modules to reject poor 
quality fingerprints, visual feedback to help the user in optimally positioning his/her finger, 
using multiple fingerprint samples to build more reliable templates, etc.) and these added-
value modules were not taken into account in the competitions. 
 The experimental protocols and findings from these competitions are described in [Cappelli2006] and 
may be consulted at the BioLab webpage of the Università di Bologna13. A very brief summary of the 
results of the competitions is presented in Table 4 where the average performance of the best three 
algorithms for the different databases considered in the experiments is reported. It should be noticed 
that results are not comparable across competitions as the data used for each of them are not the 
same (i.e. four databases were used in all competitions, but always different). For instance, in FVC 
2004 very bad quality samples were acquired on purpose (e.g. wet fingers, very dry skin, excessive 
pressure on the scanner, etc.) and were introduced into the tests to understand the impact of quality 
on the systems’ performance. 
Results in Table 4 are reported in terms of the Equal Error Rate (EER), which, for verification systems, 
is defined as the operating point where FMR=FNMR (see Section 2.4. for a definition of FMR and 
FNMR). 
FVC2000 FVC2002 FVC2004 FVC2006 FVC-OnGoing 
2.85% 0.29% 1.52% 1.97% 0.12% 
Table 4. Average accuracy in terms of the Equal Error Rate (EER) of the best three performing 
algorithms over the different FVC databases. A direct comparison across different competitions is not 
possible due to the use of databases of unequal difficulty. 
SECTION 2. SUMMARY OF KEY CONCEPTS: 
- The accuracy of an AFIS is fully dependent on the data used for its evaluation, and more precisely 
on the quality of that data (see Section 3 for further details on biometric quality). 
- Other factors that affect the performance of an AFIS are: size of the searched database, number of 
fingerprints used for the search, expected response time and size of the ranked list of identities 
returned by the system. 
- Given good quality data and ten print vs ten print searches, independent evaluation campaigns have 
shown that the accuracy of current AFIS technology is very high, with error rates of around 0.1%. 
 
                                                          
13 https://biolab.csr.unibo.it/home.asp 
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3 Fingerprint Quality  
3.1 Introductory elements  
As presented in Section 2, many studies and benchmarks have shown that the accuracy of biometric 
systems heavily depends on the quality of the acquired input samples [Alonso2012]. If quality can be 
improved, either by sensor design, user interface design or by standards compliance better accuracy 
will be obtained. For those aspects of quality that cannot be designed-in, an ability to analyse the 
quality of a live sample is needed. This is useful primarily in initiating the reacquisition from a user, 
but also for the real-time selection of the best sample, and the selective invocation of different 
processing methods. That is why quality measurement algorithms are increasingly deployed in 
operational biometric systems. 
Biometric quality measurement has vital roles to play in improving biometric system accuracy and 
efficiency during the capture process (as a control-loop variable to initiate reacquisition), in database 
maintenance (sample update), in enterprise wide quality-assurance surveying, in invocation of quality-
directed processing of samples and even in security-related tasks [Galbally2014]. Neglecting quality 
measurement will adversely impact the accuracy and efficiency of biometric recognition systems (e.g. 
verification and identification of individuals). Accordingly, biometric quality measurement algorithms 
are increasingly deployed in operational systems. These elements motivated the need for biometric 
quality standardization efforts. 
This section, summarizes some of the main issues to be taken into account regarding the estimation 
of biometric quality and how it can be used to enhance the performance of biometric systems, giving 
an overall framework of the challenges involved. The section starts with some general concepts 
regarding biometric quality and then focuses on specific factors that concern fingerprint quality. 
3.1.1 Signal quality and system accuracy 
One of the main challenges faced by biometric technologies is accuracy degradation in less controlled 
environments such as, for instance, portable handheld devices or forensic scenarios (e.g. latent 
fingerprints). These environments will require robust recognition algorithms that can handle a range 
of changing characteristics. In such uncontrolled situations there are intrinsic operational factors that 
further degrade recognition performance and that are not generally replicated in controlled studies.  
Conditions that are progressively more difficult significantly decrease performance, despite 
improvements in technology. In the 2000 and 2002 Fingerprint Verification Competitions 
(https://biolab.csr.unibo.it/fvcongoing), fingerprint data was acquired without any special restriction, 
resulting in a decrease of one order of magnitude in the Equal Error Rate. In 2004, researchers 
organising the competition intentionally corrupted samples (for example, by asking people to 
exaggeratedly rotate or press their finger against the sensor, or by artificially drying or moisturizing 
the skin with water or alcohol). Logically, a corresponding performance decrease occurred. 
3.1.2 What is biometric sample quality? 
Broadly, a biometric sample is of good quality if it is suitable for personal recognition. Recent 
standardization efforts (ISO/IEC 29794-1) have established three components of biometric-sample 
quality: 
- Character indicates the source’s inherent discriminative capability. 
- Fidelity is the degree of similarity between the sample and its source, attributable to each step 
through which the sample is processed. 
- Utility is a sample’s impact on the biometric system’s overall performance, where the concept 
of sample quality is a scalar quantity that is related monotonically to the performance of the 
system. 
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3.1.3 What is a biometric quality metric? 
Essentially, a quality metric is a function or algorithm that takes as input a biometric sample and 
outputs a value or score defining the quality of the sample. It is important to note that automatic 
quality metrics do not necessarily measure quality in the same way that humans perceive it, therefore, 
their results are not always aligned with the subjective quality estimation of experts 
[Langenburg2012]. 
Researchers have developed quality assessment algorithms mainly for fingerprint, iris, voice, face, and 
signature. Unfortunately, almost all of the many algorithms have been tested under limited, 
heterogeneous frameworks. This diversity of test conditions is due primarily to the fact that the 




Figure 1. DET curves (see Annex 1 for further details on this accuracy metric) corresponding to the same 
fingerprint recognition system working on different quality fingerprint groups. It can be observed that, 
as the quality of the data used is higher (from 5 to 1) the accuracy of the system significantly improves. 
The figure has been extracted from [Tabassi2007] 
One of the biggest challenges to be faced by biometric quality metrics is the fact that although 
biometric matching involves at least two samples, these are not acquired at the same time. Reference 
samples are stored in the system database and are later compared with new samples provided during 
system operation. So, a quality assessment algorithm should be able to work with individual samples, 
even though it ultimately aims to improve recognition performance when matching two or more 
samples.  
One of the main characteristics a quality metric is expected to present is to mirror the sample’s utility 
so that higher-quality samples lead to better identification of individuals. Accordingly, quality should 
be predictive of recognition accuracy. This concept was formalized in [Grother2007], where the 
authors presented a framework for evaluating and comparing quality measures in terms of the 
capability of predicting system performance. Broadly, they defined biometric sample quality as a 
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biometric sample is used for recognition. By partitioning the biometric data into different groups 
according to certain quality criteria, the quality measure will give an ordered indication of accuracy 
between quality groups. This effect is shown in Figure 1 which depicts the DET curves (see Annex 1 for 
a definition of DET curves) for different fingerprint quality groups annotated using NFIQ (further 
details about NFIQ are given in Section 3.4.). It can be observed that the best accuracy of the system 
is obtained for the data of the best quality group (i.e. NFIQ=1) and then gradually deteriorates for the 
rest of the groups. This way, the rejection of low-quality samples will decrease error rates in 
proportion to the fraction rejected. 
3.2 Factors affecting fingerprint quality 
Quality factors may be classified on the basis of their relationship with the system’s different parts. 
We propose to distinguish five classes:  
- Origin-related, 
- User-related, 
- User-sensor interaction, 
- Acquisition sensor, 
- Processing-system factors.  
Each of these factors is briefly analysed in the following sections. 
3.2.1 Origin-related factors: live-scanned, inked and latents 
In the case of AFIS used for law-enforcement purposes, such as potentially the SIS-II system, the 
feature extraction and matching algorithms have to cope with samples produced from multiple 
sources which can present very different quality levels. In particular: 
- Live-scanned fingerprints: this is nowadays the most extended form of fingerprint acquisition 
device. Samples acquisition uses sensors that directly produce a digital image of the 
fingerprint. Although most usual scanners are based on optical technology, other solutions 
are also available on the market such as capacitive or ultrasound sensors. In general, optical 
scanners produce the best quality. 
- Inked fingerprints: this corresponds to the traditional way of fingerprint acquisition. In this 
case the person whose fingerprint is being acquired places his/her finger on an ink pad and 
then immediately onto paper. The whole process is guided and supervised by a human 
operator. Then, the fingerprint image is digitalized with a scanner. Although such an 
acquisition method is becoming obsolete there is still a non-negligible percentage of 
fingerprints that are acquired using this procedure. Furthermore, the vast majority of 
fingerprints dating from more than 15-20 years ago, before the arrival of the new live-
scanning technology, are inked samples, especially in the law enforcement domain. Therefore, 
current fingerprint recognition systems and especially those intended for law enforcement 
use, are required to be compatible with this type of sample. 
- Latent fingerprints: contrary to the previous two categories, in this case the person whose 
fingerprints are being processed is not present at the moment of the acquisition. The 
fingerprints are lifted from a surface touched by the individual and digitalized in successive 
steps. In general, latent fingerprints are only relevant in the framework of law-enforcement 
contexts such as SIS-II. Regarding quality, latent fingerprints pose a huge challenge as there is 
no possibility to reacquire the sample. Furthermore, as there is obviously no user cooperation, 
latents in general present low quality features including: limited availability of ridge patterns, 
brush strokes, circular markings, background noise, stains etc. [Yoon2013]. 
Further discussion on the different type of fingerprint data that AFIS have to deal with may be found 
in Annex 1. 
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3.2.2 User-related factors 
These factors include physical/physiological and behavioural factors. As they are entirely related to 
the user — a person’s inherent features are difficult or impossible to modify — they are the most 
difficult to control. 
Physical/physiological. These include, for instance, age or gender — subjects cannot alter these 
features depending on the biometric system being used. Therefore, recognition algorithms must 
account for data variability in these categories. Also, diseases or injuries can alter features such as the 
finger, sometimes irreversibly, possibly making them impractical for recognition.  
- The user’s age can affect recognition in several ways. Although fingerprint characteristics are 
highly stable, they change until adolescence and during old age [JRC2013].  
- Gender can cause differences as female fingerprints tend to present narrower ridges which 
are closer together. 
Behavioural. Sometimes, people can modify their behaviours or habits. It is possible to alleviate many 
behavioural factors by taking corrective actions. However, this is not always possible, such as in 
forensic or surveillance applications. On the other hand, depending on the application, such corrective 
actions could be counterproductive, resulting in subjects being reluctant to use the system. In general, 
the supervision of the acquisition process by a well-trained human operator can reduce, to a large 
extent, the influence of these factors. Some of these factors include: 
- Tiredness, distraction, cooperativity, motivation, nervousness. 
- Pressure against the sensor. 
- Inconsistent contact. 
- Skin condition, which refers to factors such as skin moisture, sweat, cuts and bruises. 
- Manual labour might affect the skin condition, in some cases irreversibly. 
3.2.3 User-sensor interaction factors 
In principle, these factors, which include environmental and operational factors, are easier to control 
than user-related factors, provided that it can be possible to supervise the interaction between the 
user and the sensor — for example, in controllable premises such as a police station. As in the previous 
case, the supervision of the acquisition process by a well-trained human operator can reduce, to a 
large extent, the influence of the following parameters: 
- Outdoor operation is especially problematic because control of other environmental factors 
can be lost. It also demands additional actions regarding sensor condition and maintenance. 
- Temperature and humidity affect skin properties (in fingerprint and palm print recognition).  
- Feedback to the user regarding the acquired data has been demonstrated to lead to better 
acquired samples, which can lead to user familiarity with the system. 
3.2.4 Acquisition sensor factors 
As mentioned previously, a growing majority of current fingerprints are acquired using specific live-
scanned sensors. In this case, the sensor is the only physical point of interaction between the user and 
the fingerprint system. Therefore, its fidelity in reproducing the original fingerprint pattern is crucial 
for the recognition system’s accuracy. The diffusion of low-cost sensors and portable devices is rapidly 
growing in the context of widening access to information and services. This represents a new scenario 
for automatic fingerprint recognition systems. 
Unfortunately, these low-cost, portable devices produce data very different from that obtained by 
dedicated, more expensive sensors. This is primarily due to smaller input areas, poor ergonomics, and 
the possibility of user mobility. Additional problems arise when data from different devices coexist in 
a fingerprint system—something common in multi-vendor markets. Algorithms must account for data 
variability in this scenario of sensor interoperability — something that can be achieved through the 
use of the following quality measures: 
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- Time between acquisitions can greatly affect system performance because data acquired from 
an individual at two different moments might differ considerably. 
- Sensors sometimes incorporate physical guides to facilitate acquisition (for example, for 
fingerprint and palm print recognition). 
- Ergonomics refers to how the acquisition device’s design facilitates user interaction. 
3.2.5 Processing-system Factors 
These factors relate to how a biometric sample is processed after it has been acquired. In principle, 
they are the easiest to control. Constraints on storage or exchange speed might impose data 
compression techniques — for example in the case of smart cards. Also, governments, regulatory 
bodies or international standards organizations might specify that biometric data must be kept in raw 
form (rather than in post-processed templates that might depend on proprietary algorithms), which 
could affect data size. 
3.3 Incorporating quality in fingerprint recognition systems 
Quality measurement algorithms can be used to modify and improve the processing and final 
performance of biometric systems. Such influence in the general working flow of the system includes: 
Quality-based processing. An identification system might apply image restoration algorithms or invoke 
different feature extraction algorithms for samples with some discernible quality problem. 
- Quality-specific enhancement algorithms. 
- Conditional execution of processing chains, including specialized processing for poor-quality 
data. 
- Extraction of features robust to the signal’s degradation. 
- Extraction of features from useful regions only. 
- Ranking of extracted features based on the local regions’ quality. 
Template updating (updating of the enrolment data and database maintenance). A quality 
measurement may be used to determine whether a newly-acquired sample should replace the already 
enrolled sample. Some systems combine old and new sample features. Quality can be used in both 
processes. 
- Storing multiple samples representing the variability associated with the user (for example, 
different portions of the fingerprint to deal with partially overlapped fingerprints). 
- Updating the stored samples with better-quality samples captured during system operation. 
Quality-based matching, decision, and fusion. Certain systems may invoke a slower but more powerful 
matching algorithm when low-quality samples are compared. Also, the logic that provides acceptance 
or rejection decisions may depend on the measured quality of the original samples. This might involve 
changing a verification system’s operating threshold for poor quality samples. For example, in 
multimodal biometrics, the relative qualities of samples of the separate modes may be used to 
augment a fusion process by: 
- Using different matching or fusion algorithms, 
- Adjusting those algorithms’ sensitivity, 
- Quantitative indication of acceptance or rejection reliability, 
- Quality-driven selection of data sources to be used for matching or fusion — for example, 
weighting schemes for quality-based ranked features or data sources. 
Monitoring and reporting across the different parts of the system help to identify problems leading to 
poor-quality signals and initiate corrective actions. This process can assess signal quality according to 
these factors: 
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- Application. Different applications might require different scanners, environment set-ups, and 
so on, which might have different effects on the acquired signals’ overall quality. 
- Site or terminal. Such assessment identifies sites or terminals that are abnormal owing to 
operator training, operational and environmental conditions etc. 
- Capture device. Such assessment identifies the impact due to different acquisition principles, 
mechanical designs etc. It also determines whether a specific scanner must be substituted if 
it doesn’t provide signals that satisfy the quality criteria. 
- Subject. Such assessment identifies interaction learning curves, which can help better train 
new users and alleviate the “first-time user” syndrome. 
- Stored template. Such assessment detects how the database’s quality varies when new 
templates are stored or old ones are updated. 
- Biometric input. If the system uses multiple biometric traits, such assessment improves how 
they’re combined. 
Monitoring and reporting can also support trend analysis by providing statistics from all applications, 
sites etc. This will let analysts identify trends in signal quality or sudden changes that need further 
investigation. 
3.4 NFIQ and NFIQ-II 
As mentioned previously in this document, a number of factors can affect the quality of fingerprint 
images: occupation, motivation/collaboration of users, age, temporary or permanent cuts, 
dryness/wetness conditions, temperature, dirt, residual prints on the sensor surface, etc. 
Unfortunately, many of these factors cannot be controlled and/or avoided. For this reason, assessing 
the quality of captured fingerprints is important for a fingerprint recognition system. 
Fingerprint quality is usually defined as a measure of the clarity of ridges and valleys and the 
extractability of the features used for identification such as minutiae, core and delta points etc. In 
other words, most of the operational schemes for fingerprint image-quality estimation are focused on 
the utility of the images, that is, their correlation to system performance. 
This relationship between a quality metric and biometric recognition performance however, is largely 
subjective: not all recognition algorithms work the same way (that is, they are not based on the same 
features), and their performance is not affected by the same factors. For example, fingerprint 
recognition algorithm A might be insensitive to rotation changes, whereas such changes severely 
affect algorithm B. In this situation, a measure of rotation will be useful for predicting B’s performance 
but not A’s. Therefore, an algorithm’s efficiency will usually be linked to a particular recognition 
algorithm or class. 
For the above reason, many different quality approaches, both local and global, have been proposed 
in the literature [Alonso2010]. However, in spite of all the efforts dedicated to the estimation of 
fingerprint quality, there is still no standard method which has been proven to outperform the rest 
for all possible recognition contexts (e.g. type of matcher, type of fingerprint, sensors). 
Such a lack of a unified way of measuring fingerprint quality drove the American National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop, in 2004, the NIST Fingerprint Image Quality (NFIQ) 
algorithm as part of their public software package NIST Biometric Image Software (NBIS). Since then, 
the NFIQ has become the de facto standard for fingerprint quality estimation and a second improved 
version of the algorithm, the NFIQ-II, is currently being developed and is expected to be released in 
September 2015. Further details regarding NFIQ and NFIQ-II are given below: 
- NFIQ. In 2004 NIST released the NIST Fingerprint Image Quality algorithm (NFIQ). Its key 
innovation with regard to previously-proposed fingerprint quality algorithms is to produce a 
quality value from a fingerprint image that is directly predictive of expected matching 
performance. The algorithm has shown very consistent performance regarding quality 
estimation over very different set-ups and is now being used in many practical applications as 
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a reliable metric. As such, it is also cited in most fingerprint quality-related publications to give 
baseline results with which to compare those of novel methods. In addition its computation 
is mandatory in the ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2007 standard (see Section 0). 
The algorithm, fully described in [NIST2004b], is based on a number of known fingerprint 
quality features which are given as input to a neural network previously trained on tagged 
data. The algorithm takes as input images that are in different format such as ANSI/NIST or 
NIST IHEAD or compressed using WSQ, baseline JPEG or lossless JPEG. The quality features are 
extracted from the image and given as input to the neural network which assigns to each input 
fingerprint image one of five quality levels (one being the highest quality and five being the 
lowest). As mentioned before, the source code for the algorithm is freely available as part of 
the NBIS distribution which is perhaps one of the most important reasons for its wide 
adoption. While the NFIQ algorithm provides a very good open-source means for determining 
fingerprint quality, its capability for determining accuracy of a specific AFIS algorithm will, in 
principle, be lower than a vendor-specific quality algorithm.  
- NFIQ-II. With advances in fingerprint technology since 2004, an update to the NFIQ algorithm 
was proposed by NIST. A workshop was held in March 2010 at NIST to address the technical 
status of fingerprint quality assessment technology and to engage industry to improve core 
finger image quality assessment technology based on lessons learned from recent 
deployments of quality assessment algorithms (including NFIQ) in large-scale identity 
management applications. Led by NIST and by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik (BSI) in Germany, a team of biometric experts, from researchers to 
developers and vendors, was set up in order to give the members’ input for the development 
of NFIQ-II. The release of the final publicly-available software tool is foreseen for September 
2015 with multiple improved features with respect to the first version of NFIQ; among them: 
an improved quality feature set, a higher number of quality levels (from five to 100), faster 
and lighter implementation, better performance and a modular design that allows for self-
training the neural network classifier on various categories of data. Another determinant 
added value is that this second version of the software will be open source. As such, it will 
allow users to better integrate it within their systems. The original distribution of the package 
will be released with an optimized solution to estimate the quality of 500dpi live-scanned 
fingerprints coming from adults and captured with optical scanners. However, its open source 
dimension and its modular design will permit re-training of the system in order to optimize it 
to the quality of other type of fingerprint data (e.g. latents, children’s fingerprints, inked 
samples etc.) 
3.5 Standards for biometric quality 
Biometric data interchange standards are needed to allow the recipient of a data record to 
successfully process data from an arbitrary producer. In other words, biometric interoperability and 
the phrase ‘‘successfully process the data” mean that the Biometric Sample Quality score can be 
accurately exchanged and interpreted by different applications. This can only be achieved if the data 
record is both syntactically and semantically in compliance with the documentary standard. 
Following advances in biometric technologies as a reliable identity authentication technique, more 
large-scale deployments (e.g. e-passport) involving multiple organizations and suppliers are being 
rolled out. Therefore, in response to a need for interoperability, biometric standards have been 
developed. 
Without interoperable biometric data standards exchange of biometric data among different 
applications is not possible. Seamless data sharing is essential to identity management applications 
when enrolment, capture, searching and screening are done by different agencies, at different times, 
using different equipment in different environments and/or locations. Interoperability allows modular 
integration of products without compromising architectural scope, and facilitates the upgrade process 
and thereby mitigates risk of obsolescence. 
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This section focuses on biometric quality standardization. Broadly, biometric quality standards serve 
the same purpose as many other standards, which is to establish an interoperable definition, 
interpretation and exchange of biometric quality data. Like other standards, biometric quality 
standards create grounds for a marketplace of off-the-shelf products and are also a necessary 
condition in order to achieve supplier independence and to avoid vendor lock-in. 
Table 5 below lists the main standards organizations and other bodies working on the development 
of biometric standards. Current development focuses on acquisition practices, sensor specifications, 
data formats and technical interfaces. Also, a registry of US-government-recommended biometric 
standards (www.biometrics.gov/standards) offers high-level guidance for their implementation. The 
two main entities working in biometrics standards are the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 and the ANSI/NIST. 
Concerning the specific incorporation of quality information the two most relevant efforts are: 
- The ISO/IEC 29794 Biometric Sample Quality Standard. 
- The ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2007 Quality Field. 
Biometric standard organizations 
International Standards Organizations: 
- IEC: International Electrotechnical Commission (www.iec.ch) 
- ISO-JTC1/SC37: International Organization for Standardization, Committee 1 on 
Information Technology, Subcommittee 37 for Biometrics 
(www.iso.org/iso/jtc1_sc37_home) 
National standards bodies: 
- ANSI: American National Standards Institute (www.ansi.org) 
Standards-developing organizations: 
- ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization (www.icao.int) 
- INCITS M1: International Committee for Information Technology Standards, Technical 
Committee M1 on Biometrics (http://standards.incits.org/a/public/group/m1) 
- NIST-ITL: American National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information 
Technology Laboratory (www.nist.gov/itl) 
Other organizations: 
- BC: Biometric Consortium (www.biometrics.org) 
- BCOE: Biometric Center of Excellence (www.biometriccoe.gov) 
- BIMA: Biometrics Identity Management Agency (www.biometrics.dod.mil) 
- IBG: International Biometric Group (www.ibgweb.com) 
- IBIA: International Biometrics and Identification Association (www.ibia.org) 
Table 5. Main organizations working on the development of Biometric standards 
3.5.1 The ISO/IEC 29794 Biometric Sample Quality Standard 
The SC37 Biometrics Subcommittee of JTC1 has published the ISO/IEC 29794, a multi-part standard 
that establishes quality requirements for generic aspects (Part 1), fingerprint image (Part 4), facial 
image (Part 5) and, possibly, other biometrics at a later stage. Specifically, part 1 of this multi-part 
standard specifies derivation, expression and interpretation of biometric quality, regardless of 
modality. It also addresses the interchange of biometric quality data via the multi-part ISO/IEC 19794 
Biometric Data Interchange Format Standard. Part 4 addresses the aspects of biometric sample quality 
that are specific to finger images ISO/IEC 19794-4. 
The generic ISO/IEC 29794-1 requires that quality values must be indicative of recognition 
performance in terms of false match rate, false non-match rate, failure to enrol and failure to acquire. 
This part defines a binary record structure for the storage of a sample’s quality data. It establishes 
requirements on the syntax and semantic content of the structure. Specifically, it states that the 
purpose of assigning a quality score to a biometric sample shall be to indicate the expected utility of 
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that sample in an automated comparison environment. That is, a quality algorithm should produce 
quality scores which target application specific performance variables. 
3.5.2 The ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2007 Quality Field 
Initiated in 1986, this standard is the earliest and most widely deployed biometric standard. It 
establishes formats for the mark-up and transmission of textual, minutia and image data between law 
enforcement agencies, both within United States and internationally. 
The ANSI/NIST standard includes defined Types for the major biometric modalities. The standard is 
multimodal in that it allows a user to define a transaction that would require, for example, fingerprint 
data as Type 14, a facial mugshot as Type 10 and the mandatory header and metadata records Type 1 
and 2. These are linked with a common numeric identifier. 
In its latest revision, it allows for multiple quality fields where each quality score could be computed 
by a different quality algorithm supplier. In addition, it mandates NIST Fingerprint Image Quality 
(NFIQ) for all Type 14 records. 
SECTION 3. SUMMARY OF KEY CONCEPTS: 
- The performance of an AFIS is fully dependent on the quality of the data (i.e. fingerprint samples) 
it runs on. 
- Many factors can affect the quality of fingerprints. Some of these factors are controllable (i.e. 
cleanliness of the sensor) and others are not (i.e. eroded fingerprints due to manual work). 
- Automatic fingerprint quality metrics play an essential role in the control of the quality of the data 
enrolled to an AFIS. 
- Different types of fingerprints can present very different quality levels. The main type of fingerprints 
an AFIS has to deal with are: inked/live-scanned, rolled/flat/latents. 
- The most challenging data in terms of performance for an AFIS are latents because there is no control 
over their quality (which is usually very poor). 
- Although there is no unique standard way of measuring fingerprint quality, NFIQ and NFIQ-II have 
become de facto standards thanks to their proven very high performance and availability. 
- Multiple quality scores can be included for the same ten prints card.  
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4 Member States National AFIS: Common 
Technical Usage and Operational 
Diversity 
The end-users of a future AFIS functionality introduced in SIS-II will be the law enforcement and border 
authorities of the different Member States (MS). As such, during the design process of such an AFIS, 
it can be very instructive to have detailed information on the national AFIS already being used in order 
to learn from the expertise already acquired and the best practice developed.  
With this purpose, the present section summarizes all the relevant features gathered during the visits 
and discussions that the JRC conducted in nine Member States’ national AFIS (see Section 1.3.2). The 
section is divided into three main parts:  
- a first subsection describing the technical use-cases given to AFIS technology in the different 
MS,  
- a second subsection which accounts for the differences observed in the operational use of 
AFIS technology,  
- a last subsection where some indicative figures regarding the size of the different national 
AFIS are given, 
It is important to underline that the objective of this section is not to present an exhaustive 
categorization of the national AFIS features on a country by country basis, but rather to highlight from 
a general point of view the main common points and differences observed in our visits. We believe 
that such a summary can help to obtain a clearer picture of the uses and operational specificities of 
current AFIS technology and facilitate their application to SIS-II. 
Different terms such as ten print matching, hit/no-hit, latent fingerprints or ranked list of identities 
are used throughout the section. These concepts are defined in Annex 1. 
4.1 Common technical use cases processed by National AFIS 
From a generic technical perspective as well as from the implementations pointed out by the different 
law-enforcement entities visited in the course of the study, use-cases may be listed in five main groups 
(detailed below), according to:  
- Origin of the fingerprints used for the consultation of the database. They may come from:  
o A person who is (or was) present at the time of the fingerprint acquisition (e.g. a 
suspect who has been arrested);  
o Latent fingerprints lifted at a crime scene. 
- Origin of the fingerprints stored in the database against which the query is performed. The 
same two possibilities apply as before. 
For each of the five main technical use-cases defined below, two basic parameters need to be defined, 
namely: 
- Minimum expected accuracy of the matching process. 
- Maximum permitted response time. 
In the short descriptions of the five technical use-cases given below, some figures are given for each 
of these two parameters (i.e. accuracy and response time). The values are presented solely for 
illustrative purposes, they are the result of the previous consultations of the SISVIS committee, the 
visits undertaken by the JRC and the scientific literature. However, they can help to understand the 
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differences among use-cases and the various requirements that have to be met in each of the possible 
scenarios. 
For all the use-cases and examples given in this section, ten print cards are assumed to contain both 
flat and rolled fingerprint samples. For a more precise definition of the different types of fingerprint 
data commonly used (e.g. flat/rolled, inked/live-scanned, latents, etc.) see Annex 1. 
As a visual aid to understand the differences among the five considered technical use-cases, a 
schematic flow chart is given for each use-case (Figure 2 to Figure 6). 
4.1.1 TECHNICAL USE-CASE 1: ten print vs ten print 
- Origin query fingerprints: a person who is present at the time of the fingerprint acquisition 
(ten print card). 
- Origin searched database: a person who is (or was) present at the time of the fingerprint 
acquisition (ten print card) 
 
Figure 2. Flow-chart corresponding to the technical use-case 1 (i.e. ten print vs ten print) identified in 
the visits to the national AFIS 
The typical situation illustrated in Figure 2 would be as follows: a person is arrested, taken to a police 
station and his/her ten print card is acquired. The ten print card is used to search in the central ten 
print database. Therefore, in this case the searched person is present both at the time of the 
acquisition of his/her ten print data and at the time the query is sent to the system (both actions are 
conducted within the same short frame of time). 
A possible variant of this scenario is that some pre-existing ten print data is used to carry out a query 
against the central ten print database. That is, the searched person was arrested some time ago in 
one of the Member States. As such, the person was present when his/her ten print data was acquired, 
but he/she is no longer be present when the actual search is conducted. 
In this use-case both the query ten print data and the ten print data stored in the database are 
acquired under strong supervision and by applying best-practice techniques, therefore, a very high 
quality can be expected. As such, the requirement for the expected accuracy of the system can be set 
very high. 
On the other hand, the suspect has been arrested and taken to a police station for some motive, 
therefore, the suspect can be held in custody for some period of time (usually several hours). As such, 
the response time of the system is not the most critical factor. 
 Minimum expected accuracy (hit – no hit, i.e. ranked list of size 1): higher than 99.9% 






 TEN PRINT 
DB 
HIT / NO-HIT 
TECHNICAL USE-CASE 1: 
PRINT vs TEN PRINT 
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4.1.2 TECHNICAL USE-CASE 2: Two print flat vs ten prints (fast identification) 
- Origin query fingerprints: a person who is present at the time of the fingerprint acquisition (2 
live-scanned fingerprints flat). 
- Origin searched database: a person who was present at the time of the fingerprint acquisition 
(ten print card) 
 
Figure 3. Flow-chart corresponding to the technical use-case 2 (i.e. fast identification or two print vs 
ten print) identified in the visits to the national AFIS 
The typical scenario illustrated by Figure 3 for this use-case would be as follows: a person is stopped 
(not necessarily arrested) to perform some check and two fingerprints are acquired with a live-scan 
flat sensor. Those two fingerprints are used to carry out a fast search in the ten print database. 
This use-case case could be helpful to perform on-the-spot checks in case a suspicion arises or in the 
frame of checks of a large population in a limited period of time (e.g. border checks at airports or 
checks in the street). 
Since the query data are two flat fingerprints (and not a ten print card as in the technical use case 1) 
the expected accuracy cannot be as high as in the previous case. However, there is still full control 
over the acquisition process both of the query and the searched data. For these reasons the accuracy 
can still be high over a short ranked list of candidates. In case the searched person is present in that 
list, he/she can be sent to a second line check where technical use-case 1 may be used. 
In this case the searched person does not necessarily need to be arrested, he/she cannot be detained 
for long. Accordingly, the response time becomes a critical parameter for this particular use-case as 
the whole process (i.e. fingerprint acquisition and query) must be kept as fast as possible. 
 Minimum expected accuracy (ranked list of five): higher than 99.9%. 
 Maximum permitted response time: 20 to 30 seconds. 
  
ACQUISITION  




 TEN PRINT 
DB 
Ranked list 
Max. size = 5 
TECHNICAL USE-CASE 2: 





Very strict time limit 
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4.1.3 TECHNICAL USE-CASE 3: Latent vs ten print 
- Origin query fingerprints: latent fingerprints lifted at crime scenes  
- Origin searched database: a person who is (or was) present at the time of the fingerprint 
acquisition (ten print card). 
 
Figure 4. Flow-chart corresponding to the technical use-case 3 (i.e. latent vs ten print) identified in the 
visits to the national AFIS 
The typical scenario illustrated in Figure 4 for this use case would be as follows: a latent fingerprint is 
found at a crime scene. It is used to launch a query against the central ten print database. 
This use-case represents a current real challenge for AFIS in terms of accuracy as there is no 
supervision or control at the time when the fingerprint was left behind. This means that the quality of 
the latent used as query data can be anywhere from very high to very poor. For this reason the 
intervention of human experts is, in principle, mandatory during the encoding process of the latent 
prior to the search in the database. Even so, it is not possible to set a strict limit on the accuracy or on 
the size M of the ranked list (this will be very dependable on the quality of the latent, the importance 
of the case etc.) 
Regarding the maximum response time, it is in principle not a critical parameter as there is no person 
being retained. However some Member States are working on a faster latent procedure applied only 
for narrowing an ongoing investigation in the frame of a terrorism crime for which response time can 
become critical. Any value from few to several minutes can be acceptable in most of the cases. 
 Minimum expected accuracy (ranked list of M): as high as possible (it depends on the query 
data, need for a performance evaluation campaign with real data). 











TECHNICAL USE-CASE 3: 
LATENT vs 10-PRINT 
Latent fingerprint: 
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4.1.4 TECHNICAL USE-CASE 4: ten print vs latent 
- Origin query fingerprints: a person who is (or was) present at the time of the fingerprint 
acquisition (ten print card). 
- Origin searched database: latent fingerprints lifted at crime scenes and stored in database as 
unsolved cases 
 
Figure 5. Flow-chart corresponding to the technical use-case 4 (i.e. ten print vs latent) identified in the 
visits to the national AFIS 
The typical scenario illustrated in Figure 5 for this use case would be as follows: a person is arrested. 
The person is searched in the database of ten print known identities (technical use case 1). 
Independently of whether he/she is identified or not, he/she is also searched in a database of latent 
fingerprints to determine if she/he might be linked with previous crimes where the author was never 
captured but the found latent stored in the database. 
This case is similar to that described in technical use-case 1 (i.e. ten print vs ten print). The main 
difference is that the searched database comprises latent fingerprints as well. As such, some human 
intervention in the processing of the latents is required before storing them in the database. 
As in technical use-case 3, in the present scenario the identification task involves latent fingerprints. 
Consequently it is not possible to set a requirement for the minimum accuracy of the system as this 
will be very dependent on the quality of the latent samples stored in the database. The final size (M) 
of the candidate list will depend on the expected accuracy of the system on the given database (for a 
lower accuracy a larger M will be needed, while a higher accuracy allows for a smaller M). 
Similar to technical use-case 1, the response time is not critical since, typically, the arrested person 
can be held for up to several hours depending of the Member States specific legislation and the 
reasons for the arrest. 
 Minimum expected accuracy (ranked list of M): as high as possible (it depends on the searched 
data, need for a performance evaluation campaign with real data). 
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4.1.5 TECHNICAL USE-CASE 5: latent vs latent 
- Origin query fingerprints: latent fingerprint lifted at crime scene 
- Origin searched database: latent fingerprints lifted at crime scenes and stored in database as 
unsolved cases 
 
Figure 6. Flow-chart corresponding to the technical use case 1 (i.e. latent vs latent) identified in the 
visits to the national AFIS 
The typical scenario illustrated in Figure 6 for this use case would be as follows: a latent fingerprint is 
found at a crime scene. It is searched in the ten print database of known identities (technical use-case 
3). Independently of whether it is identified or not, it is also searched in the database of latent 
fingerprints to determine if the same person committed some previous crime for which he was not 
arrested. 
This is probably the most challenging use-case from a technical perspective as there is no control on 
the quality of either the query or the searched data. Consequently, this is the use-case where the 
lowest performance of the AFIS may be expected and therefore where the largest size M of the final 
ranked list is required. It should also be highlighted that this is a much rarer use-case than all previous 
examples. 
The response time requirements for this case are even more flexible than in the technical use-case 4 
as this scenario does not involve the arrest of a suspect. 
 Minimum expected accuracy (ranked list of M): as high as possible (it depends on the searched 
data, need for a performance evaluation campaign with real data). 
 Maximum permitted response time (this is not a critical requirement): up to 120 minutes. 
4.2 Further technical diversity of implemented national AFIS  
In addition to the five common use-cases identified in all the deployed national AFIS described in the 
previous section, further operational differences have been found in the different national AFIS visited 
(see Section 1.3.2.) which are reported in this section. In general, these differences mainly affect the 
methodologies followed in the operational procedures of the AFIS, which may vary from country to 
country. 
Acquisition technology. For the acquisition process, although live-scan sensors are currently a 
growing solution and the only option selected for new deployments, the traditional paper-and-ink 
method is still used in numerous cases. 
Fingerprint image resolution. The worldwide de facto standard for the resolution of fingerprint 
images is 500dpi. As such, the current live-scanners used at the visited MSs acquire 500dpi images. It 
is true that there is a recent and growing trend in the production of 1000dpi sensors which require a 
higher storage capacity and processing power as the produced images are significantly larger than 
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type of higher resolution image. However, even though some of the visited AFIS are able to store and 
process 1000dpi images, these samples are down-scaled to 500dpi prior to performing automatic 
matching. Therefore, for the moment, 1000dpi images are basically used solely for visualization 
purposes (by human examiners) but the actual automatic identification uses the current standard of 
500dpi. In fact, different works have analysed the impact of image resolution on the final accuracy of 
AFIS and have not found any significant difference between 500dpi and 1000dpi images. Even so, the 
growing use of 1000dpi sensors should be taken into account in the implementation of new AFIS. 
Human intervention. Some Member States decided to completely rely on the automatic capabilities 
of their national AFIS to encode the fingerprint templates without human expert intervention. Those 
system or at least the parts of those system which are fully automatic are also called “lights out” 
systems. Other Member States complement the fully automatic coding of templates with the 
systematic intervention of fingerprint experts in order to validate the coding and to improve, when 
necessary, the positioning of the fingerprint minutiae not only in the case of latent fingerprints (which 
is the case for all of them) but also for ten prints cards. In all cases an automatic quality check is 
performed at the time of acquisition. If the quality is not good enough, the fingerprint is reacquired 
until it passes the threshold. If the minimum quality threshold is still not reached, the fingerprint is 
processed by a human expert who detects, possibly complements and validates the minutiae points. 
The main trend observed is that as the system improves from a quality and accuracy points of view, 
the rôle of human intervention tends to decrease accordingly. Still this human intervention remains a 
key factor for accuracy in numerous scenarios and the promotion of best practice will further support 
the increase of accuracy in an AFIS.  
Fast consultations. As described in Technical Use-Case 2, some Member States have developed fast 
consultation of their national AFIS. These consultations can be performed with ten prints flat or even 
with two prints flat. The aim is to reduce the overall procedure time but also to reach more possible 
locations for consultation using mobile solutions. Depending on the results, the persons can be the 
subject of a second line of consultation involving a full comparison of the ten prints flats and rolled. In 
all these cases, a live-scan is used.  
Latent fingerprints. The identification of latent fingerprints in the context of a judicial procedure 
usually requires the “four eyes” principle (i.e. two different fingerprint experts have to agree on the 
final decision), however, in some Members States this procedure could include multiple steps 
involving up to seven fingerprint experts. The number of required minutiae to be used in court is 
typically 12 although this is highly dependent on the law of each Member State and this number can 
even go down to 8 if the minutiae points are sufficiently discriminatory according to the forensic 
experts [Ulery2014]. This dimension is not directly related to a possible implementation of an AFIS for 
SIS-II, however, it stresses the need for a high quality enrolment process so as to improve, in the best 
possible way, the results on queries using latents. 
In addition, the storage of latent fingerprints triggers different legal issues, as the identity of the 
person to whom the latents belong is by definition initially unknown. This situation can lead to the 
storage within a criminal AFIS of latent fingerprints belonging to innocent citizens whose fingerprints 
were found at a crime scene (e.g. the latent fingerprints of a police officer who was inspecting the 
scene). Therefore, in the case of AFIS with a database of unknown latent fingerprints (also called 
unsolved case database), it is mandatory to have a common regulatory framework that defines a clear 
protocol specifying under what circumstances a latent fingerprint can be stored in the database and 
the procedure to follow when a hit is obtained from a search in this database. The MS visited have 
similar (still not equal) procedures and legal frameworks that regulate the use of latent fingerprint 
databases within their national AFIS. As underlined later in this report, currently, the SIS-II legislation 
does not foresee the storage of latent fingerprint.  
AFIS performance assessment. Regarding the performance assessment of the national AFIS, different 
methodologies have been identified among the Member States. Broadly, performance evaluation 
strategies may be divided into three groups:  
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 Member States that do not carry out an independent evaluation of AFIS on their own real data 
(the final performance figures are those provided by the vendor);  
 Member States that carry out their own assessment of the AFIS performance at the time of 
the call for tender or when the AFIS is first purchased; and  
 Member States that perform independent evaluations of the AFIS, on a specific dataset 
containing real data, every time an update of the system is introduced.  
It has to be underlined that conducting an independent benchmark of the performance of an AFIS is 
a costly and time-consuming action for which the benefits are not always immediately evident. The 
growing and relatively high maturity of the technology could also play a role in the lack of motivation 
for conducting such a task. However, where the result of such a benchmark leads to a higher 
performance of the system, the quality threshold for accepting fingerprints can possibly be lowered 
resulting in a wider identification capability.  
4.3 Size of Member States AFIS  
In this section, the main figures (only average numbers are given) related to the size of some of the 
national AFIS visited are provided. The aim is to give a concrete overall view of the AFIS already in 
operation. It should be underlined that for all of them, those figures such as the number of ten prints 
cards stored in the system are relatively stable over the year.  
4.3.1 National criminal AFIS in France.  
Last year, 900 000 dataset (ten print cards rolled and flat) were submitted to the national criminal 
AFIS by the 485 access points. The database contains around five million records rolled and flat. All of 
them are validated by an operator. Regarding latent fingerprints, the database contains 230 000 prints 
from unsolved cases and 140 000 were submitted to the system after having been processed and 
encoded by an expert.  
4.3.2 National criminal AFIS in The Netherlands  
With around 500 requests per day coming from 300 access points, the Dutch system provides a two-
step approach: firstly, a fully automatized step uses ten prints flat. Secondly, in case of no hit, rolled 
fingerprints are used as well. The database contains 1.2 million records (ten print cards rolled and flat) 
and around 160 000 latent fingerprints from unsolved cases.  
4.3.3 National criminal AFIS in Portugal  
With around 14 000 ten print cards (rolled and flat) submitted every year, the central AFIS managed 
by the Ministry of Justice contains 237 000 ten print cards and around 200 000 latent fingerprints.  
4.3.4 National criminal AFIS in Germany 
The federal criminal AFIS stores around 3.2 million dataset (ten print card rolled and flat) and all of 
them have been manually validated before storage.The system is queried by 160 000 standard 
identification requests and 110 000 high priority requests called Fast ID (six flat fingerprints are used 
and a reply is expected within five minutes). The system also contains 422 000 latents from unsolved 
crime and processes every year 380 000 requests with latents (1200 per day).  
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SECTION 4. SUMMARY OF KEY CONCEPTS: 
- From a technical perspective, the two main parameters defining the use-cases of AFIS are: the origin 
of the enrolled fingerprints in the AFIS database and the origin of the query fingerprints used to 
perform an identification. 
- Three main types of queries are currently being implemented in most MS AFIS: full ten print 
searches, fast searches (using two-six live-scanned flat fingerprints), and searches using latent 
fingerprints. 
- Different levels of human intervention (by expert forensic examiners) are implemented in MS AFIS. 
In general, this intervention level is very high in the case of latent fingerprint processing. 
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5 Non-Member States AFIS in production: 
illustrative examples 
In addition to the nine Member States national AFIS (i.e. end-users of SIS-II), the JRC visited the United 
States of America (see Section 1.3.2) in order to gather information regarding the large- scale AFIS 
already being used in the country and which present significant similarities with an eventual AFIS 
which could be integrated in SIS-II. This information was complemented with further details obtained 
from other European AFIS already in production such as those in EURODAC or in the Visa Information 
System (VIS). 
This section aims to provide the reader with an overview of the information related to these AFIS as 
they present significant similarities to the use and operational context of SIS-II. As in the previous 
section, the objective is not to give a detailed description of each AFIS, but to present a summary of 
their most relevant features so that the reader can build a general picture of the capabilities of AFIS 
technology today.  
5.1 EURODAC 
Launched in January 2003 in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000, EURODAC is the 
oldest EU system offering an AFIS functionality. This Regulation establishes an EU asylum fingerprint 
database which aims to support the effective application of the Dublin Convention14. When someone 
applies for asylum, regardless of his/her location within the EU, his/her fingerprints (a ten print card) 
are transmitted to the EURODAC central system.  
Reviewed in 2013, this Regulation has been replaced, since 20 July 2015, by Regulation (EU) No 
603/201315 which introduced a series of new elements relevant for this report. In particular law 
enforcement access to the system is now allowed under certain conditions and latents can be used 
when querying the database.  
According to the Annual Report 201416 produced by eu-LISA, EURODAC stores 2.7 million sets of 
fingerprints (ten prints flat) and a total of 756,368 transactions took place. The fingerprint rejection 
rate observed in 2014 was 4.49%.  
EURODAC offers some interesting learning elements from the perspective of a SIS-II AFIS. Since 20 July 
2015, searches with latents have been included and although there is not yet enough experience in 
its use, this system should be carefully monitored in order to obtain useful information to be applied 
to a future SIS-II AFIS. The size of the database is of a similar magnitude to SIS-II. However the volume 
of transactions is far smaller and the time-frame for dealing with requests is quite large (24 hours for 
a normal request and one hour for an urgent comparison).  
5.2 Visa Information System (VIS)  
In production since October 2011, the Visa Information System (VIS) allows the exchange of visa data 
between Schengen States. Around 12 million fingerprint datasets (flat ten print card) have been stored 
in the central database so far. In July 2015, the VIS roll out process reached 45%. Since October 2014, 
                                                          
14 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) 
15 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0603 
16 http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/Eurodac%202014%20Annual%20Report.pdf 
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it is mandatory to conduct fingerprint verification at the first line of control at the border and in mid-
July an average of 10 000 verifications (one to one) per day could be observed.  
The system also offers an AFIS functionality, mainly used in the frame of new VISA applications or at 
the second line of control at the border with an average of 20 to 30 000 identification queries per day 
and a maximum peak/hour of 2600. According to the Service Level Agreement a reply to an 
identification query should be sent in less than ten minutes (less than three seconds for a verification 
with one to four fingers). Identification queries are conducted using a ten print card.  
According to the VIS regulatory framework the three following cases of fingerprint processing are 
taking place: 
1. In the course of a VISA application request, the fingerprint record is introduced and submitted 
to the VIS central system. The VISA applicant is enrolled and his/her fingerprints are checked 
against the database for possible duplicates/matches before completing the request.  
2. The second case is the processing operation which takes place at the borders of the Schengen 
area with a verification and if necessary an identification using the AFIS functionality of the 
VIS at the second line for further checks.  
3. The third case is a law enforcement access under the conditions foreseen by the VIS Decision. 
Contrary to EURODAC, the use of latent for these queries is not foreseen by the VIS legislation.  
When this VIS rollout will be completed, up to 100 000 identification queries per day can be expected. 
During a VISA application process, a check against SIS-II is, in principle, also conducted. Today 
alphanumerical data are used for this check, but it is expected that fingerprints would be used if the 
SIS-II offers an AFIS functionality.  
5.3 United States AFIS  
The United States have deployed a series of AFIS in the multiple contexts at federal and State levels. 
The two biggest Federal systems are those from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which also seem to be the most similar to EU systems such 
as SIS-II. These two systems are briefly introduced below.  
5.3.1 FBI: Next Generation Identification System 
Initiated in 2007, the project for a Next Generation Identification (NGI) system of the FBI entered into 
production in September 2014 “on schedule, under budget, with all objectives achieved” as confirmed 
by the FBI during our visit. FBI biometric activity is based on more than 60 years of continuous 
investment and development with the NGI as the ultimate step. The database holds around 70 million 
records. Each consultation can lead to three possible scores: the best is fully automatic, the second 
will require the involvement of one examiner, and the lowest will require two examiners.  
The overall architecture of the system is very similar to what might be expected in EU systems such as 
SIS-II: there are 50 access points to the NGI corresponding to the 50 States of the US. The way a 
consultation is processed will vary according to its nature: criminal (with priority) or civil. The 
processing always starts with a smaller part of the database comprising “the worst of the worst” (some 
nine million subjects related to the most serious crime). Compared to the previous system, NGI 
increased the accuracy from 96% to 99.6% (ten prints against ten prints) and, accordingly, manual 
review decreased by 90%.  
In addition to the standard consultation ( ten prints), a mobile solution (called RISC) for field officers 
was recently developed. It uses two fingerprints and is delivering three potential hit feedback within 
four seconds: red (between 3 to 7%), yellow or green.This consultation is only against the most critical 
criminal database. 22 States are participating so far with an average of 2000 searches per day. 
NGI is also used for civil procedure such as the process of vetting persons in positions of trust (police 
officers, teachers, civil servant etc.). The service is charged to the organization requesting it.  
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The other new dimension of NGI is the introduction of new modalities: facial recognition is used 
against mugshots (20 million). In addition, the FBI has a centralised facial services unit aiming to pre-
process the images received before submitting them to the system. Face is used just as a possible lead 
but not as evidence. An iris recognition-based system is also being used but so far only in the specific 
case of prisoner management during transfer. 
The FBI claims to satisfy, with its central database, 60 different jurisdictions across federal states. 
Authorities in the federal states can access data stemming from other federal states only if the 
relevant laws allow it (a system quite similar to the links introduced in SIS-II). 
The FBI also provides a centralised fingerprints laboratory based in Quantico where all the requests 
for latent fingerprint within the country are processed. Three possible consultations have been 
defined:  
- a “quick launch” for which the possible minutiae of the latent are encoded automatically and 
then sent to the AFIS.  
- a manual encoding for which an expert complements and validates the automatic encoding. 
- a full manual encoding by an expert.  
NGI is three times more accurate than the previous system. The examination of the list of candidates 
proposed by the system (usually ten) is done by two examiners (blind verification), and three main 
criteria are applied: quality, number of minutiae and surface. Around 100 latents/month are analysed 
by experts and 2000/month through the quick launch option (mainly for terrorist cases). From the 
total amount, around 18-20 per month are linked to missing persons (a type of alert also available in 
SIS-II). The system starts to list potential candidates with at least three minutiae. For a Unique Latent 
Matching, (formal identification), the USA does not apply any limit regarding the number of minutiae 
(In the EU it is between ten and 12 according to the MS visited). 
The usage of Extended Feature Sets (EFS) for latent searches is envisaged for the future but is not yet 
implemented in the NGI AFIS.  
5.3.2 Department of Homeland Security - Office of Biometric Identity Management 
The Department of Homeland Security is managing a 130 million record AFIS database that provides 
services to a series of US agencies. Regarding the use of the DHS database at the borders, a Service 
Level Agreement sets out that fingerprint checks should not take more than 30 seconds during which 
a series of verification/identification transactions are conducted in the DHS as well as in the FBI 
database (10 seconds against the nine million “worst of the worst” records, 20 seconds against all 
other records).  
Given the very large size of the database, a matching strategy has been defined and deployed based 
on a risk assessment approach. Using the information provided by the machine readable zone (MRZ) 
of a passport (alphanumeric search), the system checks if the person is already registered and, in that 
case, only a verification is performed. If the person is not registered, identification is performed 
against a limited list of the most wanted persons as a first action and the process is accelerated by 
again using the information provided by the MRZ such as the age, the gender etc. Fifty different types 
of cases/alerts can lead to an enrolment, among them there is the possibility to “flag” only, essentially 
an “attention drawn” message (similar to Article 36 of SIS-II Decision related to persons for discreet 
or specific check). The quality threshold is deliberately maintained at a relatively low level according 
to DHS representatives met. In the case of a hit, the person goes to a second line of check.  
Further checks with a faster response time but with a much lower risk are also performed after the 
person has left the check point. Around 300 000 consultations are conducted every day. 
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SECTION 5. SUMMARY OF KEY CONCEPTS: 
- There are already large-scale AFIS in operation in the world. Some of the use-cases and features of 
these AFIS are similar to those which can be expected for the SIS-II AFIS. 
- Most national AFIS conduct searches on databases of more than five million records. 
- There are already large-scale AFIS that can process over 10 000 consultations per day. 
- In the case of AFIS working with a large database and processing a large volume of queries, it is 
important to define a specific matching strategy according to a priority or risk assessment of the 
different types of query. 
 
 
  46 
 
6 Lessons learned: challenges faced by AFIS 
technology 
All the information regarding AFIS technology gathered during the five initial phases of the project 
(see in Section 1.3) has allowed to identify the different challenges currently faced by this type of 
system including in implementation. Such challenges, which in many cases are intertwined, can be 
summarized as follows: 
- Use-cases: probably the most critical parameter in the design of an AFIS is the definition of 
the use-cases, scenarios and operational context in which the system will be used. These use-
cases will determine, to a large extent, the type and number of enrolment/consultations that 
the system will have to support and, therefore, all the other parameters listed below are 
somewhat linked to this one. 
- Performance: this feature refers to the accuracy of the system, that is, its ability to find in a 
given database the queried identity. Very high performance becomes especially critical in the 
case of AFIS that have to cope with large databases. 
- Quality: this feature refers to the biometric quality of the fingerprints that are processed in 
the system. Ensuring high quality, especially of the samples enrolled in the database, is a 
critical parameter in order to achieve a high level of performance. 
- Integrity of the database: this feature refers to the correctness of the data stored in the AFIS 
database. Typical errors that are usually observed in AFIS databases include: doubled 
fingerprints, mixed fingerprints (e.g. an index finger that is labelled as ring finger), fingerprints 
not corresponding to the right person, incomplete ten print cards, missing fingerprints, 
inconsistency between alphanumeric data and fingerprint data etc. It is absolutely critical for 
the correct functioning of an AFIS to mitigate, as much as possible, this risk.  
- Type of data being processed: with regard to the use-cases, it is important to define the type 
of fingerprint data that the system will have to work with in enrolment, consultation and test. 
For instance, possible types of fingerprints are: flats/rolled, live-scanned/inked/latents, 
individual/ten prints etc. The quality of the different type of data differs significantly and 
therefore it also has an impact on the final performance of the system. 
- Latent fingerprints: they are probably the biggest challenged face by current AFIS due to their 
anticipated very low quality. Defining a specific processing strategy for this particular type of 
data (i.e. fully automatic, partially assisted etc.) is usually required to obtain the expected 
performance standards.  
In addition, the storage of these data triggers different legal issues, as the identity of the person is 
unknown. This situation can lead to the storage within a criminal AFIS of latent fingerprints belonging 
to innocent citizens whose fingerprints were found at a crime scene. Therefore, in the case of an AFIS 
with a database of unknown latent fingerprints, it is mandatory to have a common regulatory 
framework that defines a clear protocol specifying under what circumstances a latent fingerprint can 
be stored in the database and the procedure to follow when a hit is obtained from a search in this 
database. Although consultation using latent fingerprint is included in the SIS-II legislation their 
storage is not.  
- Speed: this feature refers to the response time of the system when a query (i.e. consultation) 
is launched. The response time can be a critical parameter for certain use-cases where the 
time constraints are very strict (e.g. first line border control). 
- Size of the database: this refers to the number of identities enrolled in the system database 
and which will be used to perform the searches. This parameter is one of the key design 
features and should be carefully estimated before putting in place any AFIS. The size of the 
database will have a big impact on the response time of the system and is one of the features 
to be taken into account when defining the minimum performance expected for the system. 
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- Number of transactions at peak hours: together with the database size and the expected 
response time, this feature is also a key design feature to size the AFIS (in terms of the 
necessary processing power). It refers to the number of consultations that the system will 
have to process and, as in the case of the database size, it should be carefully estimated in the 
design phase. 
- Matching capacity: this feature is totally linked to the previous one (i.e. number of 
transactions). It refers to the number of matchings (i.e. comparisons between individual 
fingerprint samples) that the system should be able to perform at peak hours. This parameter 
is required, as each different type of transaction may imply a different number of matchings. 
- Strategy to handle the queries: although this may be considered a secondary feature it may 
play a very important role in the transaction response time and therefore in the resources 
needed by the AFIS. For instance, in many cases, it is useful to assign a priority to each 
transaction depending, for instance, on the expected response time.  
- Exchange formats: it is essential to define a unique, standardized exchange format for the 
different type of data handled by the system (e.g. fingerprint images, fingerprint templates, 
scores etc.) 
- Multiple fingerprint records: the possibility to store multiple fingerprint records could offer 
the possibility to apply an improved quality strategy such as using the best record or produce 
a composite ten print record with the best available fingerprint images. The strategy may vary 
according to the fingerprint submitted for consultation (latent or ten print).  
- Operational procedures: in some AFIS users follow different operational procedures to 
interact with the system (e.g. fingerprint acquisition methodology). Although such diversity is 
not crucial for the successful integration of an AFIS, it can have a negative impact on its 
accuracy. Therefore, it is preferable to work towards the harmonization of such 
methodologies and their best practices in order to achieve the maximum possible 
performance of the system. 
- Human intervention: although representing a decreasing part of the overall, process thanks 
to performance improvement in biometric technology, manual processing remains an 
important step in some uses-cases and should therefore be optimised.  
- Maintenance and performance evaluation: benchmarking the performance of an AFIS is a 
healthy and important task to be conducted during the life-cycle of a biometric system. This 
task not only provides important information on the performance of the system in production 
(with real data) but can also be a useful tool for fine-tuning the system and eventually improve 
its performance.  
- System architecture: all the previous technical features, as well as other parameters derived 
from the specific context (e.g. political) in which an AFIS will be deployed, should be taken 
into account during the design phase in order to select the most suitable architecture (e.g. 
distributed, centralized, hybrid). 
The aim of the next part of the report will be to detail and address these challenges, whenever 
possible, in the context of SIS-II and its potential AFIS functionality.  
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PART II: THE AFIS IN SIS-II 
PART II of this report is focused on SIS-II and its future AFIS functionality. This part refers to and builds 
upon many of the concepts, terms and general aspects of AFIS technology already described in PART 
I. PART II is based on the following rationale: 
Firstly, taking into account its legislative framework, a description of the key aspects concerning SIS-II 
today (i.e. with no AFIS integrated) is presented. 
Secondly, according to the challenges exposed in Section 6 (PART I) and to the specificities of the SIS-
II described below in Section 7.1 (PART II), a series of recommendations are set out on how to tackle 
such challenges in order to implement an AFIS in SIS-II in the most effective manner. 
Thirdly, adopting a more prospective view which goes beyond today’s regulatory framework, we 
describe some possible functionalities that could be further added to SIS-II in order to improve its 
utility and accuracy and provide consolidated services. 
Fourthly, we present the final conclusions of the report. 
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7 The Schengen Information System II  
In order to put the potential SIS-II AFIS into perspective, EU large-scale biometric systems, national 
AFIS and US AFIS have been described in the report primarily with the aim of more accurately 
understanding the nature and volume of processing operations which can be envisaged for a SIS-II 
AFIS. In this section, we present, first of all, the main facts describing SIS-II today. Then, a series of use-
cases, which can be foreseen by SIS-II regulatory framework, is described and compared with those 
previously introduced. 
7.1 SIS-II today  
As already introduced in Section 1.1, SIS-II was launched with a double intention: to contribute to law 
enforcement cooperation between the Member States and support external border control. Police 
and border guards are able to enter and consult alerts on certain categories of wanted or missing 
persons and objects. SIS-II consists of three major components: a central system (CS-SIS-II), national 
systems which may contain a synchronised copy of the central system and a communication 
infrastructure (network) between the central system and the national systems.  
The SIS-II central system, managed by the EU agency eu-LISA, is where all the alerts produced by the 
Member States are stored. A real-time updated copy of the central system can be maintained by each 
Member State, according to Article 4 of SIS-II legislation. Some Member States have a partial copy 
comprising only the alphanumeric data of the alerts, others have a full copy including face and 
fingerprint images17.  
According to the annual and detailed reports produced by eu-LISA18, SIS-II contains today 61 million 
alerts and only 1.43% of those alerts are related to persons (slightly less than 800 000 on 1 January 
2015, as presented in Figure 7. As will be underlined later, this is a relatively small amount compared 
to the national AFIS visited in the course of this study (see Section 5). Even if it is already allowed 
according to Article 22, not all of these alerts will lead to an upload of fingerprints. Indeed, fingerprint 
data corresponding to the person related to those alerts are not always available.  
On the other hand, the volume of consultations can be considered very large, with almost two billion 
queries in 2014 but with only 350 million of them directed to the central system, which handles around 
20% of the overall transactions. The other 80% of transactions (i.e. 1.65 billion) are processed through 
national copies. As will be discussed later, these figures refer to the total number of queries including 
all alerts, not just those alerts related to persons which are the only alerts that could potentially have 
fingerprints associated with them. 
                                                          
17 It can be noted that fingerprint template interoperability does not constitute an issue within EU systems like 
EURODAC or VIS as these systems were designed to only accept fingerprint images as input. In case the AFIS 
provider changes, the fingerprint images are simply “re-coded” into the new templates of the new AFIS provider. 
This is possible only if the system is a lights out system with no human intervention for the encoding phase (which 
is not usually the case for latent fingerprints). 
18 http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/p_reports/Pages/default.aspx 
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Figure 7. Distribution of alerts in SIS-II in 2014 (source eu-LISA) 
7.2 Fingerprints use-cases from the SIS-II Regulation and Decision 
A prerequisite for an accurate assessment of “the availability and readiness of the required 
technology” is a proper identification of possible use-cases involving the automatic processing of 
fingerprints. In this section we discuss the use-cases which have been identified from the SIS-II 
Regulation and Decision. 
The aim is to compare the use-cases offered by the SIS-II regulatory framework for which fingerprints 
will be processed with those developed at national level in the framework of law enforcement and 
border management activities identified in Section 4.1. Logically it is expected that the solid expertise 
built at national level over a long period of time will be applied, whenever possible, to the 
development of the use-cases offered by a potential SIS-II AFIS. 
The SIS-II regulatory framework provides a series of actions for which fingerprints might be processed. 
Two main categories of use-cases can be foreseen regarding the processing of such data:  
- CUD transactions: An alert is the subject of Creation/Update/Delete (CUD) action during 
which fingerprint will be processed, enrolled, updated or deleted from the AFIS database. 
Therefore all these operations can potentially entail a change in the AFIS database.  
- Consultations: The SIS-II database is consulted using fingerprints, that is, the AFIS is used to 
launch a search on the fingerprint database looking for a given identity (i.e. subject). In these 
operations no modification is performed in the fingerprint database.  
 It should be underlined that a consultation will take place, in any case, prior to a CUD of an alert 
(creation operation in particular) in order to detect if this new alert might be related to the same 
person of another alert which has already been introduced. The Member State which is entering this 
new alert then has the possibility to create a link with these existing alerts in conformity with Article 
52 of the SIS-II Decision.  
7.2.1 Issuance of new alerts 
The SIS-II Regulation and Decision offer Member States multiple possibilities for introducing new alerts 
in the central system and some of these alerts relate to persons i.e. third country nationals and EU 
citizens. As detailed previously, for a total of 61 million alerts, slightly less than one million relate to 
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persons. According to the 2014 statistics, around 17 million CUD (Creation, Update and Delete of alert) 
transactions took place and 1.4 million of those transactions were related to persons.  
Although fingerprints are not on the mandatory list of data required for creating an alert, whenever 
available they shall be entered. The following list of cases corresponds to the possible alerts Member 
States can process (CUD) using fingerprints.  
7.2.1.1 Case A: Refusing entry and stay (Regulation, Article 24)  
According to the SIS-II Regulation, an alert can be issued for the purpose of refusing entry and stay to 
third country nationals. This type of alert is by far the most frequent related to persons with 68.56% 
of the total. Assuming that a Member State issuing the alert has access to the third country national 
who is the subject of this alert, ten prints will be collected (preferably rolled and flat, see Section 8.6), 
added to the alert and eventually compared with the ten prints cards already introduced in the SIS-II 
database which might lead to the creation of links with other alerts, whenever it is allowed.  
Case A is covered by the technical use-case 1 (ten print vs ten print) described in Section 4.1.1. 
7.2.1.2 Case B: Misused identity (Decision, Article 51) 
According to the SIS-II Regulation and Decision, with the consent of the data subject whose identity 
has been misused, Member States can introduce, among other personal data, the fingerprints of the 
victim of the misuse, to the alert related to the person who misused this identity. This measure, which 
will lead to an Update of an alert and not a Creation per se, will allow the authorities to distinguish 
between the impostor and the victim, as the victim can prove his/her identity whenever necessary. 
Today, after a possible hit from an alphanumeric search at the first line of control at the border, the 
identity of the victim can be verified and confirmed at the second line of control. 
Case B is covered by the technical use-case 1 described in Section 4.1.1. (ten print vs ten print). A ten 
print card will be introduced and also compared at a later stage only with the ten print cards already 
stored under the related alert in the system.  
7.2.1.3 Case C: Arrest for surrender or extradition (Decision, Article 26)  
According to the SIS-II Decision, a Member State issuing an alert related to a person wanted for arrest 
for extradition or surrender purposes on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant has the possibility to 
complement the alert with fingerprints when they are available. In principle, the person subject of this 
alert might not be accessible at the time of the issue of the alert and fingerprints will not be available. 
However, it might be possible that the Member State issuing the alert already has, in its national AFIS, 
the fingerprints of this person and is therefore in a position to complete the alert with these data. Ten 
prints will be collected, added to the alert and eventually compared with the ten print cards already 
introduced in the system for possible additional links with other alerts. It is also possible that the 
subject of this new alert has been already the subject of another type of alert for which the fingerprints 
have been collected.  
Case C is covered by the technical use-case 1 described in Section 4.1.1. (ten print vs ten print). 
According to part 2.13 of the SIRENE Manual19 these fingerprints can also be provided by another 
Member State.  
7.2.1.4 Case D: Missing persons (Decision, Article 32) 
According to the SIS-II Decision, Member States can issue alerts on missing persons. In principle, the 
fingerprints of these persons are not always available when the alert is created. However, in certain 
cases, if a national registry is available and if national legislation allows it, fingerprints can be 
transferred from this registry to the alert. Also, in the course of the investigation, latent fingerprints 
                                                          
19 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D0219&from=EN 
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of the missing person may be used to query the database (not to be stored in the database), then it is 
no longer a CUD transaction but a consultation case described in Section 7.2.2. 
Depending on the exact situation described above, Case D is covered by technical use-case 1 (ten print 
vs ten print) described in Section 4.1.1. 
7.2.1.5 Case E: Persons sought to assist with a judicial procedure (Decision, Article 34) 
According to the SIS-II Decision, Member States can issue new alerts on persons involved in a judicial 
procedure, such as, a witness who has to attend a criminal trial. Like case D, fingerprints might not 
always be available; however, whenever it is the case, Member States can complement the alert with 
them even from their own national AFIS database. Those situations might trigger issues related to the 
format of available fingerprints which may not be fully compliant with the SIS-II format.  
Depending on the scenario, Case E is covered by technical use-case 1 (ten print vs ten print) described 
in Section 4.1.1 
7.2.1.6 Case F: Discreet or specific checks (Decision Article 36)  
According to the SIS-II Decision, Member States can issue alerts on persons in the context of 
prosecuting criminal offences and for the prevention of threats to public security. Here again there 
might be cases where fingerprints are not available. The nature of the checks (see Section 7.2.2 on 
consultation) implies that, in principle, fingerprints are not likely to be accessible at a later stage or at 
least it is not probable that a full ten print card will be collected. However, border checks might offer 
the possibility to collect these fingerprints and complement the alert introduced by another Member 
State or at least, in a case of discreet surveillance, to conduct a simple check.  
Depending on the scenario, Case B is covered by technical use-case 1 (ten print vs ten print) described 
in Section 4.1.1. 
7.2.2 Consultation of the SIS-II database 
As defined by the SIS-II Decision and Regulation (Article 40 and Article 27), several authorities have 
the right to access and consult the alerts stored in the system. Almost all the technical cases defined 
in Section 4.1 will cover the range of possible consultations and therefore usages of a possible SIS-II 
AFIS. The last two technical use-cases defined in Section 0 (latent vs latent) and 0 (ten prints vs latent) 
will not be part of those possible consultations under the existing SIS-II regulatory framework which 
does not foresee the possibility to store such data within an alert.  
Today those consultations are carried out using alphanumeric data and take place in activities such as 
investigation and prosecution, border checks, VISA and asylum processing operations.  
When the AFIS functionality is implemented all the possible alerts listed in the previous section which 
are related to a person (case A to F) might be the subject of a consultation such as ten print vs ten 
print (technical use-case 1), two print flat vs ten prints (technical use-case 2) and latent vs ten print 
(technical use-case 3). 
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8 Facing AFIS implementation challenges: 
Recommendations 
Following the different challenges identified in Section 6 related to the implementation of large scale 
AFIS, and given the specificities of SIS-II described in Section 7, a general view on how those challenges 
may be addressed for the SIS-II context as well as different options for the actual design and use of 
the envisaged AFIS functionality are presented in this section. Some practical recommendations are 
also given. In some cases, those challenges identified in Section 6 that are very much intertwined have 
been grouped into the same subsection. 
8.1  Size quantification of the SIS-II AFIS: database and volume of 
transactions 
As defined in the AFIS challenges described in Section 6, the size of an AFIS is determined mainly by 
two main parameters: 
1. Size of the Database with all the fingerprint records on which searches will be conducted,  
2. Volume of transactions to be processed by the AFIS.  
Both parameters are quite independent as there are already working systems with small databases 
and a very large volume of transactions and others with very large databases and limited transactions.  
The current statistics on the use of SIS-II (some of which were already provided in Section 7), allow us 
to make a first overall estimation of the size of the SIS-II AFIS both in terms of database size and of 
volume of transactions. The next subsections give this initial view of the AFIS size. 
8.1.1 Size of the SIS-II AFIS database 
As already stated earlier, there are slightly than one million alerts related to persons. This number 
seems to be quite stable over time with only a slight variation. If for all these persons, fingerprints 
were available and attached to an alert (by September 2015 slightly less than 97 000 sets of 
fingerprints had been introduced), the size of the necessary IT platform to support such an AFIS would 
not exceed the size of the different national AFIS visited. Some of the AFIS used in large Member States 
contain ten times more data (as described in Section 4).  
As confirmed by the Member States, the relatively small number of fingerprint records already stored 
in SIS-II is mainly due to the absence of an AFIS functionality. It can therefore be expected that the 
number of fingerprints will considerably increase as soon as this functionality is implemented. In the 
light of the relative stability in the number of records stored in the respective national AFIS, it can be 
expected that the number of alerts related to persons will be relatively stable in the long run. A slight 
increase in the number of alerts related to persons might however be observed at the beginning of 
the introduction of the AFIS functionality as it will raise new interest in creating alerts which will have 
a better chance of a possible hit with such a functionality.  
8.1.2 Volume of transactions for the SIS-II AFIS 
The elements contributing to the quantification of the number of transactions to be processed by the 
future SIS-II AFIS can be grouped into the three following categories: 
1. Consultations which are already sent to the SIS-II today and will be supported most probably 
by the AFIS: considering that new VISA applications should be checked against SIS-II (see 
Section 5.2), it can be already assumed that up to 100 000 identification queries per day will 
be conducted in the future SIS-II AFIS from consular posts. Similarly, according to the 2014 
report, the EURODAC system processed 750 000 transactions and, prior to these transactions, 
the VIS system as well as SIS-II shall be consulted for the purpose of the prevention, detection 
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and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences. As soon as the AFIS 
is available it can be assumed that those consultations will also be based on fingerprints 
complementing the alphanumeric data. Last but not least, checks at external Schengen 
borders lead, in principle today, to an alphanumeric consultation of SIS-II which could, later 
on, also be complemented by a fingerprint check. For the volume of those possible border 
checks two sources are available today: the 2015 Risk Analysis report of FRONTEX20 where the 
last available passenger flow mentions 700 million for 2011, and the Technical study on Smart 
Borders published in October 2014 which forecasts 550 million border crossings21 for 2014.  
2. Elements which could further increase the volume of transactions: as confirmed by all the 
Members States consulted, the introduction of an AFIS will greatly improve the 
attractiveness/usefulness of the consultation related to persons. This new functionality could 
also in itself potentially increase the number of new alerts created which are related to 
persons.  
3. Elements which could decrease the volume of transactions: as already underlined, not all the 
alerts related to persons can be complemented with fingerprints (i.e. in some cases the 
fingerprint data may not be available). The availability of fingerprints is not a pre-requisite for 
the introduction of an alert related to a person according to Article 23(1). Accordingly, not all 
the queries related to persons can be conducted using fingerprints, such as in the case of 
missing persons or in some situations related to discreet surveillance. It has to be noted that, 
under strict conditions, for those Member States having a national fingerprint registry, it is 
possible to conduct searches on missing persons using the fingerprint records registered in 
their national database.  
Quantification of the required transaction capabilities is much harder to predict at this point than the 
size of the database. This assessment depends on the identified use-cases, the number of access 
points (which can vary from 500 000 to one million for SIS-II) as well as the volume and frequency of 
those transactions. A reasonable starting point for an initial estimation is the number of operations 
related to persons from the total number of queries performed in the SIS-II today, comprising: 1) the 
processing of alerts (CUD) and, 2) the consultations (i.e. searches on the database). A first estimation 
of these two figures is given below. 
8.1.2.1 CUD transactions 
As introduced before (see Section 7.1), according to the annual report provided by eu-LISA, the 
processing of alerts (CUD) has generated 1.4 million transactions related to persons in 2014. Among 
these CUD, around 780 000 were related to the Creation, Update and Delete of alerts on persons for 
which a fingerprint processing (check) operation can be potentially expected.  
8.1.2.2 Consultation transactions 
The largest percentage of transactions using the AFIS functionality will come from the database 
consultations in SIS-II. In 2014 almost two billion queries have been sent to SIS-II with 20% of them to 
the central system and the rest to the national copies managed by Member States. Of course, not all 
those consultations (around 350 million in 2014 for the central system) were related to persons but 
unfortunately this specific statistic is not directly available today. It is also true that not all the 
consultations related to persons will be introduced using a fingerprint, but Member States clearly 
confirmed that whenever possible in the sphere of law enforcement or border check activity the 
functionality will be used in a fast way (two prints) and/or exhaustive way (ten prints).  
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RECOMMENDATION 1:  Need for complementary statistics  
- We recommend that, following a consultation with the EDPS by the Commission, eu-LISA identifies 
the best possible ways to include in its statistic annual report the number of consultations per 
year related to persons. In order to complement this assessment at central level, we also 
recommend that Member States report annually on the number of consultations related to 
persons that have been carried out on their national copies and, whenever possible, on the 
context of these consultations (e.g. at the police office, at border check).  
8.2 Use of the SIS-II AFIS driven by national AFIS expertise 
Since the AFIS functionality of SIS-II will be used following methodologies comparable to other 
fingerprint-related national tools for law enforcement, it is expected that similar levels of information 
will be provided and handled. This would imply, as is already the case at national level, the inclusion 
of all fingerprint types (i.e. flat/rolled, live-scanned/inked and latents).  
RECOMMENDATION 2:  Promotion of best practices 
- We recommend that the expertise acquired during the development and management of national 
AFIS is appropriately applied to the SIS-II AFIS deployment and that best practices identified at 
national level are further fostered.  
8.3 Common exchange formats  
The SIRENE Manual (part 2.13.5) requires a check at national level regarding the compliance of 
fingerprints to be uploaded to the system with the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000 specified format. However, 
it seems that there is still some diversity between Member States on how the sets of fingerprints have 
to be encoded, stored and transmitted.  
RECOMMENDATION 3:  Common exchange standard  
- So far, NIST containers, as required by the SIRENE Manual and the best practice guide from 
Interpol22, seem to provide an appropriate basis regarding the exchange of fingerprint data. We 
recommend that an automatic check for their mandatory and complete implementation should 
be developed in order to appropriately support the deployment of the SIS-II AFIS functionality. 
8.4 Use and possible overlap with other systems  
All visited law-enforcement entities agreed that there is an urgent need for an AFIS functionality to be 
implemented in SIS-II. Having access only to alphanumeric data greatly limits the potential use of the 
system and its added value compared to systems like Prüm.  
It was noticed that the perspective of the Members States regarding the SIS-II AFIS evolved in the 
course of the visits. In most cases, at the beginning of the visit, the possible overlap between the two 
systems was underlined by the law enforcement officers. However, in the second and last part of each 
visit, Member States perceived, in a clearer way, the specific added value of a possible SIS-II AFIS and 
concluded that this functionality could become a good Prüm partner.  
RECOMMENDATION 4:  Prüm and SIS-II complementarity 
- A need for clarification between the functionalities of Prüm system and of a future SIS-II AFIS was 
strongly identified during the visits. We recommend that this need is addressed. 
                                                          
22 Guidelines concerning Fingerprint Transmission. INTERPOL OS/FTD/IDFP (2012)  
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8.5 Architecture  
The challenge of the future AFIS architecture supporting SIS-II should be addressed in two spheres: 
the interaction between the Member States and the central system, and the internal organization of 
the system itself. The options suggested below mainly illustrate the first sphere. The second sphere 
will only be tackled briefly as it will, in principle, be the subject of a targeted and deeper IT technical 
analysis conducted by eu-LISA which is in charge of the management of such systems and has the 
responsibility of updating, whenever needed, the Interface Control Document (ICD) of SIS-II, 
describing in full technical detail the possible interactions between the central system and the 
Member States.  
The options suggested by the JRC, as well as any other potential choices for the possible architecture 
of the SIS-II AFIS functionality, will have to at least take into account the following elements: 
- The current architecture of SIS-II is composed of a central system dealing with 20% of the 
queries and of national copies which can be partial, with only alphanumeric data (nine 
Member States have such copies) or complete, (16 Member States are in this position) with 
the biometric data (image of face and fingerprints). The five remaining Member States have 
only direct access to the central system. Accordingly, 80% of the queries are processed using 
the national copies. In the light of this situation we can conclude that an AFIS at the central 
system is required, in order to provide first this functionality to the Member States which 
do not have national copy or only a partial copy, and second to the Member States which 
might face a temporary technical issue with their national copy.  
- All Member States use the central system for Creation, Update and Deletion (CUD) of alerts. 
The introduction of an alert will require, as a matter of consistency, a quality check at the 
central system operated by the AFIS. Any processing of an alert (CUD transaction) sent to the 
central system is then broadcast, within three minutes maximum, to the existing national 
copies. An AFIS will, therefore, be necessary at central system level for CUD processing 
operations. 
- According to Article 9(2) of SIS-II regulatory framework, a search in a national copy shall 
produce a result equivalent to that of a search in the SIS-II database. The necessary 
compliance with this article for alphanumeric searches will have to, in principle, also be 
applied for fingerprint searches. A SIS-II AFIS running on a SIS-II national copy will have to 
offer the same identification results (accuracy, behaviour) as that running on the central 
system.  
Taking into account the elements listed above, it can already be concluded that an option proposing 
the use of existing national AFIS for querying national copies could be legally uncertain as it would not 
be in compliance with the SIS-II regulatory framework. If this option were allowed, it will no longer be 
possible to guarantee that equivalent results for a query in the central system and a national copy will 
be obtained.  
8.5.1 Option 1: A unique AFIS running on SIS-II central system only  
As presented in Figure 8 below, it is envisaged in this option that the SIS-II AFIS functionality would 
only be provided by the SIS-II central system. Member States B with a full national copy would query 
the central system whenever they need to conduct a fingerprint identification. However, for a manual 
confirmation of a result (in principle a hit) to be conducted by a dactyloscopic expert, the fingerprint 
images also stored in the national copy might be used in order to limit the traffic with the central 
system.  
The other Members States A and C, having only alphanumeric data or even no national copy, would 
fully rely on the SIS-II AFIS of the central system.  
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The national copy contains only images of fingerprints. The central system, supported by the AFIS 
functionality, would also store templates of the fingerprints (encoded fingerprints).  
8.5.2 Option 2: A unique AFIS running on SIS-II central system and national copies  
In order to offer a complete decentralized solution to the Member States which already have a full 
national copy, the “hybrid “option described in Figure 9. CS SIS-II AFIS + National SIS-II AFIS can be 
proposed.  
 
Figure 9. CS SIS-II AFIS + National SIS-II AFIS 
With this architecture option, any technical update of the central system SIS-II AFIS functionality 
would also be broadcasted to the Member States having a full national copy and the same national 
SIS-II AFIS functionality so as to guarantee the consistency of results at national and central level. Such 
broadcasts would take place in addition to the synchronization of the central database with the 
national copies. This principle is equivalent to an anti-virus solution implemented in an organization 
where a central server keeps up-to-date the anti-virus running on each client machine of the corporate 
network. 
With this option, it would also be possible for Member State B to have a full national copy (with 
fingerprint images) and still query the central SIS-II AFIS. This option would offer the advantage of 
distributing the processing power required by matching processes triggered by consultation and CUD 
Figure 8. CS SIS-II AFIS only 
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operations. Like the previous option, Member State A & C, with only partial copy or no copy, will use 
the central system SIS-II AFIS.  
8.5.3 Internal architecture of the AFIS 
As soon as the option for the overall architecture has been selected and defined, a targeted analysis 
will have to be conducted so as to define the best possible choices from an IT point of view and 
introduce them, in detail, in the new ICD of SIS-II. However, in the light of the national AFIS visited, 
some preliminary points can already be suggested for this stage.  
A dedicated sub-system for searches involving latents could, for example, be proposed as well as 
another for fast identification queries leading to hit/no hit replies only. Possible synergies with other 
large-scale IT systems, in order to obtain higher efficiency and cost effectiveness, can also be foreseen: 
a sub-system dealing with latents could, for example, be shared with other systems also requiring this 
functionality, such as EURODAC, without compromising the data from each system which are kept 
separated. It could even be considered to use the best possible AFIS algorithm for each category of 
query: following a performance benchmark analysis, the best AFIS for latent search and for ten print 
searches would be selected.  
RECOMMENDATION 5:  Dedicated sub-systems 
- In order to better respect the different business cases envisaged for a SIS-II AFIS, we recommend 
to consider in the design of such a system the use of dedicated sub-systems for each category of 
query.  
8.6 Enrolment  
To a certain extent, it can be considered that enrolment phases are already conducted in the SIS-II as 
some Member States have uploaded fingerprint images in the central system (around 97.000 by 
September 2015), but as pointed out in the next section, some critical parts of this enrolment are still 
missing. In any case, the future AFIS functionality will have to deal mainly with two possible situations:  
1. enrolment phase with the data subject available. 
2. enrolment phase supported by information extracted from previous enrolment data stored in 
other systems.  
RECOMMENDATION 6:  High-quality enrolment process  
- We recommend that, whenever a data subject is available, that is, in most of the cases, the 
enrolment phase should favour the use of live-scan devices and be conducted under the control 
of experienced operators, as is usually the case in a law enforcement context. This should result 
in the production of a high-quality ten print card containing both rolled and flat data.  
 As observed in most of Member States national AFIS, multiple records from the same person are 
stored in the database and can cover, in some cases, a relatively long period of time. Four datasets 
have been usually observed. The benefits of such storage are twofold. Having several datasets from 
the same person offers the possibility of increasing the performance of the matching process by 
selecting the fingers with the highest quality score. Basically, the AFIS application builds the best 
possible ten print card (known as a composite ten print card) from the prints available in the system 
and, of course, belonging to the same person. The second possible added value for keeping several 
datasets is the potential improvement for latent matching processes. Even if some of the fingerprints 
of those datasets did not reach a satisfactory quality score and will not be selected for a ten print card 
matching process, they might present unique features which will produce a hit from a latent matching 
process.  
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RECOMMENDATION 7:  Storage of multiple datasets  
- We recommend to envisage the storage of multiple datasets (e.g. four datasets) for a SIS-II AFIS 
to support a composite matching strategy. As long as it is clearly established that the datasets 
belong to a same person, a composite check would be the result of multiple datasets associated 
with a single alert or datasets belonging to several alerts, which should already benefit of links 
established in accordance with Article 52 of the SIS-II Decision. 
Figure 10 summarizes the possibilities for enrolment in the context of law enforcement activities in 
addition to the consultation possibilities further explained in Section 8.8.  
 
Figure 10. Law enforcement  
When the person, subject of a new alert, is not available to the authority that will introduce the alert, 
it might be possible that fingerprint records belonging to this person are technically and legally 
available in some other national system such as a criminal AFIS or a national registry. As foreseen in 
the SIRENE Manual part 2.13, these fingerprints can also be provided by an authority in another 
Member State. In both cases the fingerprint datasets might not fulfill all the quality and presentation 
standards required for a full enrolment in the SIS-II AFIS. They might, for example, be only flat prints 
and the quality may have been computed by a different system.  
RECOMMENDATION 8:  Controlled transfer of datasets 
- We recommend that SIS-II AFIS accepts fingerprint datasets produced via other systems, as long 
as the parameters of these systems are kept in the dataset included in the alert. NIST containers 
offer the possibility to keep several quality scores issued by different systems.  
  
  
  61 
 
8.7 Quality  
As emphasised strongly throughout the report, quality should be considered as the main key success 
factor for an efficient deployment of the SIS-II AFIS. Below we propose a series of recommendations 
aiming to control, to the largest possible extent, biometric sample quality. Three points of action have 
been identified: 
- the capture point (a critical point of action because it acts as the main interface between the 
user and the system) which has already been partially covered in Section 8.6 related to 
enrolment, 
- the quality assessment algorithm, 
- the system performing the recognition. 
As already mentioned in Section 3, improved quality, by either capture point design or system design, 
will lead to better performance. Some of the identified measures to improve quality include, for 
instance, initiating reacquisition from a user, selecting the best sample in real time or selectively 
evoking different processing methods.  
8.7.1 Capture point 
RECOMMENDATION 9:  Quality of capture points  
- Supervision by an operator. Adequate operator training is recommended, as supervision of 
biometric acquisition is a repetitive task and requires additional attention in the case of 
centralised enrolment stations. The aim is to avoid tiredness and boredom adversely affecting the 
process. 
- Adequate sensor. We recommend to use performant fingerprint sensors (e.g. in size and 
resolution), offering also enhanced capabilities to acquire low-quality sources. Whenever possible 
live-scan devices should be favoured for capturing fingerprints. 
- Enhanced graphic user interface (GUI). We recommend that capture points have large displays 
and provide real-time feedback of acquired data. 
- Proper user interaction. The enrolment process should be user-friendly with clear procedures 
which are properly explained. The use of good ergonomics should support better acquisition 
practices. 
- Adequate environment. The acquisition environment should be appropriate in terms of 
illumination, temperature and backgrounds both for the subject and the operator. These elements 
are recommended mainly for fixed stations but similar considerations are instrumental as well for 
mobile stations.  
- Sensor maintenance. There should be regular and systematic cleaning of the enrolment stations 
to avoid “ghost fingerprint” effect, especially in the case of consultation processes taking place in 
heavily used check points. 
8.7.2 Assessment algorithms 
RECOMMENDATION 10:  Quality assessment algorithms 
- Adherence to standards. We recommend to include in a SIS-II AFIS the results of the quality 
metrics algorithm used locally by Member States as well as the results of the use of standard 
quality metrics such as NFIQ and NFIQ-II. These two results will complement those provided by 
the quality metrics algorithm of the SIS-II Central AFIS functionality. All three results can be added 
in a single NIST container, as for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000 standard (see Recommendation 3 above). 
- Corrective actions. We recommend to implement an acquisition loop/recapture procedure to be 
carried out until satisfactory quality prints have been obtained. This procedure should 
contemplate alternative acquisition processes, according to the sample quality, and should 
include human intervention, where appropriate.  
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8.7.3 Identification system 
RECOMMENDATION 11:  Quality of identification systems 
- Quality-based processing. In addition to the standard algorithms and tools used for fingerprint 
identification, we recommend the use of supplementary tools such as alternative feature 
extraction functions and process-specific matching algorithms. 
- Quality based fusion. We recommend to combine different samples so as to be able to conduct 
composite checks. Should the revision of the SIS legislation allow this option at a later stage, it 
would be interesting to combine different biometric traits (e.g. multimodal biometric matching 
system) to improve identification results. 
- Template substitution/update. When generating templates for an AFIS, we recommend to select 
best stored samples.  
- Monitoring. We recommend to produce statistics for each type of applications, sites, devices, and 
operators, so as to obtain a user-scanner learning curve and propose training measures, as 
needed. 
8.7.4 Other quality-related aspects 
In addition to the previous points, other quality related aspects that should be taken into account are 
as follows.  
RECOMMENDATION 12:  Children cases  
- The majority of alerts on missing persons are related to minors. We recommend that a SIS-II AFIS 
includes the possibility to tune the matching process towards such cases, in particular, when 
fingerprint data in the alert are more than two years old.   
RECOMMENDATION 13:  Quality check central service  
- We recommend that an automated central service is offered to Member States to check 
fingerprint quality against the SIS-II AFIS quality metrics. A similar service exists already for the VIS 
with a response time of less than 30 seconds. Such a system would provide a significant additional 
feedback to the operator on the quality of the fingerprint dataset being acquired. 
RECOMMENDATION 14:  Reporting on lower quality fingerprint card 
- We recommend to record when a dataset, which is proposed for enrolment or for addition in an 
alert, has not the quality level required for the SIS-II AFIS either in an alert or in the dataset card 
itself. Such a record would take place, for instance, when a ten print card is produced from a 
system that acquires flat prints only (e.g. the VIS).  
RECOMMENDATION 15:  Integrity of the database 
- We recommend the use of best practices to reduce the risk of inconsistency or erroneous data, 
including fingerprints, recorded in the database. Efficient methods should be designed to find, 
mitigate, correct or prevent the occurrence of such issues. These methods are of organizational 
and technical nature. As an example, during a two print consultation, a cross-check should be 
conducted on the two fingers. In case of a match between a left index and a right index stored in 
the AFIS, a message should be sent to the Member States which has introduced the alert.  
8.8 Consultation  
Fingerprints will be also processed whenever an authority conducts a search in the SIS-II as detailed 
in Chapter X of the SIS-II Decision and Chapter V of the SIS-II Regulation. These consultations will take 
place in the course of checks at Schengen external borders or in consular posts and for checks 
conducted by police and border check authorities within Member States. These searches might take 
place in conjunction with the use of other EU large-scale IT systems such as the VIS and EURODAC. 
Figure 10 above within Section 8.6 describes consultations taking place in the context of law 
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enforcement activities and Figure 11 below summarizes the consultation cases triggered by border 
control.  
 
Figure 11. Border checks 
Based on the use-cases identified and the expert contribution provided by Member States visited, we 
recommend that SIS-II AFIS should be designed so as to properly handle consultations with the 
following types of datasets:  
RECOMMENDATION 16:   Consultation 
- Enhanced resolution (1000dpi). We recommend to give the possibility to store fingerprints at a 
1000dpi resolution to those Member States that have already upgraded their scanners at that 
resolution.  
- Flat and rolled fingerprints. We recommend that Member States should be allowed, for 
consultation only, to limit fingerprint collection only to flat prints. Member States have already 
implemented this option at national level since it is a faster method compared to using both flat 
and rolled data.  
- Two prints fast check. We recommend to offer the possibility to carry out quick consultations. 
Such quick consultations are required in situations such as first line border control or on-the-spot 
street checks. The result of these consultations should be a hit/no hit reply which can trigger, in 
case of a hit, a second line control check.  
Although a number of possible candidates should be proposed by default in the case of latent 
searches, the operator should have the opportunity to customize this number. All of these 
consultations will be based on different requirements regarding processing time, frequency and 
amount of data involved. However it can already be stated that mainly three types of time constraint 
will be faced according to the nature of the search.  
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RECOMMENDATION 17:  Appropriate response times  
- We recommend that the SIS-II AFIS complies with the following three response times, which are 
at this stage only indicative and tend to reflect the discussion which took place with Member 
States: (a) A very short response time (i.e. below 30 seconds) should be expected from a first line 
of border control check or a mobile check by a field law enforcement officer. (b) A medium 
response time (i.e. below five minutes) should be expected from a second line control check at 
the border or at a consular post (e.g. in the course of a VISA application). (c) A longer response 
time (i.e. up to ten minutes) could be tolerated for law enforcement consultations taking place at 
a police station, especially in the case of latents.  
In addition, most of the Member States have implemented in their national AFIS different priority 
levels for the requests to be processed. As those requests are subject to a manual validation, usually 
centralized (such as in France and Germany), an indication of the level of urgency is necessary. If 
processed automatically, this level of urgency (defined and provided by the operator who entered the 
search) can offer the possibility of streamlining and spreading the incoming requests across the day. 
Accordingly, a latent request which would have been qualified as normal, should be processed within 
24 hours. On the other hand the same request labelled as high priority (in relation to a terrorism event) 
will be processed in less than ten minutes.  
RECOMMENDATION 18:  Queries priority  
- We recommend the definition of priority levels for processing queries in order for a SIS-II AFIS to 
manage better the workload of the system.  
The processing time for the matching can also be reduced and optimized with the application of search 
tactics based on filters. It can be envisaged that the operator will link an identification query with one 
or several alphanumeric fields such as gender or age. In this way the search population will be reduced. 
On the other hand, as long as the SIS-II AFIS remains at a limited size as underlined above, such search 
tactics would probably not be necessary in the near future. 
8.9 Performance evaluation 
As described in Section 2, the performance of an AFIS is totally dependent on the data used for its 
evaluation. Therefore, in order to obtain an accurate picture of the performance that can be expected 
from the SIS-II AFIS, it is highly recommended that this assessment is conducted on the data available 
from the SIS-II fingerprint database itself. 
RECOMMENDATION 19:  Performance benchmark 
- Considering that carrying out an in-depth performance evaluation is time and resource 
consuming, we recommend that such evaluations are planned already in the development phase 
of a SIS-II AFIS and are performed at the time of its rollout, as well as, every four years or every 
time a major update of the matching system is installed, whichever comes first.  
Such periodical performance benchmarking will fulfil the following objectives: 
- Assess the actual accuracy of the matching system with its final production environment. 
The performance of this AFIS has to be evaluated with the real data stored in the SIS-II 
database which are different to those used by the provider. The result obtained should not 
necessarily be below the performance level promised or obtained in the frame of a NIST 
evaluation campaign as mentioned in Section 2.  
- the SIS-II fingerprint database will change over time and therefore the performance of the 
AFIS will not be static in time. A periodic assessment of its performance will permit the 
detection of eventual drops in AFIS accuracy which will, most likely, denote a worsening of 
the quality of the fingerprints being used in the system. It can also reveal improvement due 
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to, for example, a full adoption of live-scan devices and offer the possibility of revising some 
initial technical constraints.  
- adapt the different thresholds (identification thresholds, quality thresholds) that need to be 
selected by the user and that have an impact on the response time of the SIS-II AFIS. 
- ensure that any update produces at least the same accuracy (if not an improvement) with 
respect to the previous version. 
Starting from the general context of biometric performance evaluation described in Section 2, readers 
interested in measuring the performance of an AFIS in an operational environment or specific 
application should refer to the document “Best Practices in Testing and Reporting Performance of 
Biometric Devices” by UKBWG (2002) and consult the standards focusing on biometric system testing: 
ISO/IEC 19795–1 (2006), ISO/IEC 19795–2 (2007), ISO/IEC TR 19795–3 (2007) and ISO/IEC 19795– 4 
(2008). In fact, volunteer or subject selection, operational conditions, and several other issues have to 
be taken into consideration when a test is performed in a laboratory or in the field. From a general 
point of view, practitioners should try to avoid some common mistakes in evaluating the performance 
of their matching algorithms such as: 
- avoid using the same dataset for training, validating and testing an algorithm. 
- do not compute performance on a very small dataset and, in particular, abstain from claiming 
that a system has a very low error rate when the errors have been measured over a small 
dataset; if possible, report the statistical significance of the results (e.g. confidence intervals). 
- avoid “cleaning” the database by removing samples that are either “rejected” or misclassified 
by the system; in principle, by iteratively removing the unwanted samples, one could reach 
any desired level of accuracy. 
- do not conclude that the accuracy of a system is better than that of a competing system when 
they have been evaluated using different datasets. 
- do not hide the weak points of an algorithm but document its failures. 
As underlined above, such a benchmark exercise will be relevant only if it is conducted on the datasets 
actually stored in SIS-II. This task will require access to the data and their corresponding ground-truth 
meta-data needed for the evaluation and therefore an active involvement of the Member States 
together with eu-LISA must be foreseen.  
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9 Beyond the SIS-II regulatory framework 
In April 2015, the European Commission adopted a Communication on “The European Agenda on 
Security” C(2015) 185 final23 setting out how the EU can bring added value to supporting the Member 
States in ensuring security. Among other actions aimed at strengthening information exchange, the 
Commission announced that the SIS will be evaluated in 2015-2016 to assess whether new operational 
needs require legislative changes, such as introducing additional categories to trigger alerts. 
Considering new technological initiatives conducted by the countries visited in the course of the JRC 
study, we suggest in this section a series of possible new operational tools and functionalities which 
might be interesting to consider in the context of the review of the SIS-II regulatory framework.  
It has to be underlined that, at this stage, these suggestions are of a prospective nature and will require 
additional targeted analysis in order to be possibly included in a revision of the SIS legislative 
framework.  
9.1 Additional biometric modalities  
9.1.1 Palm recognition 
As numerous Member States are currently using the NIST container and standard for uploading 
fingerprint images in the SIS-II, it is quite probable that palm prints might have already been 
introduced as they are usually part of this container.  
All the Member States visited have databases containing palm prints and process them with their 
respective AFIS in the course of investigating crime.  
An introduction of palm prints in SIS-II would imply a modification of the legal framework and an 
adaptation of the envisaged AFIS which would need to cope with such prints although no fundamental 
technical differences exist. They can be processed using the same matching characteristics. It should 
be underlined that in the Prüm Decision, the term “dactyloscopic data” is used and covers both palm 
print and fingerprints. 
If introduced in SIS-II palm prints will be used exclusively in the context of crime scenes from which 
latent prints might be collected and compared with those stored in the SIS-II AFIS.  
9.1.2 Face recognition system  
Some Member States have already started to test face recognition solutions (e.g. The Netherlands, 
Spain, Germany). As confirmed by all of them, such functionality would constitute a solid 
improvement, as in some cases this might be the only available data. It has to be underlined that 
according to Article 22(a) faces are already added to alerts and stored in the SIS-II (around 40 000 at 
the end of 2014).  
Although not as accurate as ten print against ten print matching systems, face recognition has made 
significant progress. The quality of the image and therefore the performance of the matching system 
are heavily dependent on the conditions of capture and, in the case of SIS-II, it can be expected that 
such conditions will be optimised as the uploaded images are at least of a frontal mugshot produced 
in a completely controlled environment (light exposure, angle, resolution, background etc.) 
The introduction of face recognition functionality in the SIS-II would require modification of Article 
22(c) and the rollout of an appropriate dedicated matching functionality adapted to this modality. 
                                                          
23 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf  
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However, it should be underlined that a special quality check is already required (Article 22(a)) 
whenever a face image is uploaded to an alert, the nature of this quality check remains to be defined.  
9.1.3 Latent database 
All national AFIS visited by the JRC contain in addition to the ten prints sets, a database of latent 
fingerprints linked with unsolved crime cases. As described in Technical cases 4 and 5 of Section 4.1, 
this latent database is typically used by Member States as a second step process when the other uses 
cases (ten prints vs ten prints) didn’t produce any hit. Requests applied to latent databases require 
more processing time than the usual ten prints against ten prints (all orientations of the print have to 
be envisaged and all combinations tested). 
Today, the SIS-II legal framework does not provide a category of alert for which those latent 
fingerprints could be stored in the system.  
9.2 Future of SIS-II: Further Experimentation 
The JRC has already conducted some biometric experiments related to the quality of children’s 
fingerprints which are described together with their results and conclusions in [JRC2013]. Such 
experiments were possible thanks to the collaboration of the Portuguese Authorities which provided 
a gross sample of their national fingerprint database for electronic passports. This collaboration was 
successfully renewed in June 2015 for two years with an even larger set of fingerprints (slightly more 
than 200 000) which also includes adults and the elderly. This sample database will enable the JRC to 
conduct some quality-related experiments that could be of relevance for the future of SIS-II and in 
particular its AFIS. 
According to the general fingerprint quality context presented in Section 3, some of the tasks that 
could be performed by the EU research community in the future regarding the development of the 
SIS-II would include: 
- generation of a reference dataset for quality evaluation (this evaluation will be however 
limited to flat prints), 
- comparison between NFIQ with NFIQ2 and predicting its relevance for SIS-II AFIS 
performance, 
- comparison of NFIQ/NFIQ2 with other proprietary quality metrics, 
- use of the NFIQ2 modular design that allows for self-training the neural network classifier on 
various categories of data and develop a dedicated version for children (to be used with alerts 
on missing persons), 
- fingerprint quality comparison among significant age groups: children, adults, elderly. 
JRC will launch, in 2016, an AFIS performance competition which can be adapted to the SIS-II context 
with the active support of the Member States and provide useful results analysis for a future SIS-II 
AFIS deployment.  
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10 Conclusion  
For more than 35 years (starting with the FBI NBS M40 algorithm brought into operation in the 1960’s) 
AFIS functionality has been intrinsically linked with databases supporting law enforcement and border 
management activities. According to its general purpose, SIS-II constitutes one of those databases and 
therefore SIS-II alerts related to persons will not deliver their full capacity and usefulness without the 
support of an Automatic Fingerprint Identification System.  
AFIS technology has reached sufficient levels of readiness and availability for its integration into SIS-
II, provided that all recommendations listed in the present report are implemented and respected 
during the rollout and utilization of the new functionality.  
The rollout of AFIS functionality should be preceded with the selection of the most appropriate special 
quality check tools (as required by Article 22(a)) and with the production of detailed statistics on 
consultations related to persons as carried out currently in SIS-II.  
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Annex 1: Main definitions and technical concepts of an AFIS  
This annex contains a brief introduction to the main definitions and technical concepts of Automatic 
Fingerprint Identification Systems. All relevant concepts are highlighted throughout the text in 
underlined bold characters.  
All the terms introduced here are used and referenced in the main sections of the report, therefore, 
it is highly recommended for those readers who are not familiar with biometric technology to carefully 
read this annex before proceeding to the rest of the document. 
The annex is divided in three main sections: 1) a general introduction to biometric technology; 2) a 
summary of the methodologies and metrics used for the performance assessment of identification 
systems; 3) an introduction to AFIS in the light of the previous two sections. 
A1.1. Introduction to biometrics 
A biometric system is essentially a pattern recognition system that makes use of biometric traits to 
recognize individuals. The objective is to establish an identity based on “who you are or what you 
produce”, rather than by “what you possess” or “what you know”. This new paradigm not only 
provides enhanced security but also avoids, in authentication applications, the need to remember 
multiple passwords and maintain multiple authentication tokens. “Who you are” refers to 
physiological characteristics such as fingerprints, iris, or face. “What you produce” refers to 
behavioural patterns which entail a learning process and that characterize your identity such as the 
written signature. 
As shown in Figure 1, biometric systems use a specific device known as a sensor (also referred to in 
some cases as a scanner) to acquire the physical biometric trait and generate a digitized version known 
as a biometric sample, named as B in Figure 12 (e.g. in the case of fingerprints the biometric sample 
B is the fingerprint image). Then, in a subsequent step, the biometric sample is processed in order to 
extract the most discriminating features (feature extraction module). These features conform to what 
is known as biometric template, named as T in Figure 1. Templates are stored in the system database 
together with an associated identity I through the enrolment process. Therefore, after enrolment, a 




Once the users have been enrolled to the system, the recognition process can be performed in two 
modes: 
- IDENTIFICATION (Figure 2, top). In this mode, the question posed to the system is: is this 
person in the database? The answer might be “No” (the person is unknown to the system), or 
any of the N registered identities in the database. In order to give the answer, the system 
compares the test template T to each of the Tn templates stored in the database. This 
ENROLLMENT 
Figure 12 Flowchart describing the enrolment process in a typical biometric system. 
Identity  I 
Feature  
Extraction 
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comparison process is known as matching process. For each pair (T, Tn), the matching module 
outputs a value referred to as similarity score that reflects the level of similarity between the 
two compared templates. 
Therefore, identification is a search operation in which a template T is used to determine if it 
corresponds to any of the In identities stored in the database. For this reason identification is known 
as a “1 to N” recognition process (also “one-to-many”), as one template is matched against N. 
In order to determine if the test template T corresponds to any of the identities enrolled in the 
database, a decision threshold δ is set. If one or more of the N matching scores sn exceed the 
threshold, the system typically returns a ranked list with the M most likely identities that correspond 
to the searched person (i.e. those that generated the M highest scores above the threshold). If none 
of the N scores sn is higher than this threshold, the searched identity is considered to not be stored in 
the database (the ranked list is empty, that is, it contains M=0 identities).  
When the maximum size of the ranked list is set to M=1, it is commonly known as a hit or no-hit 
system, that is, the system will only output one identity (expected to be the correct one) or none. In 
most identification systems, at a later stage, a human expert manually checks the results and decides 
whether the subject is or is not within the reduced group of M ranked identities. Typical identification 
applications include Automatic Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS). 
- VERIFICATION (Figure 13, bottom). In this case, what we want to know is if a person is really 
who she claims to be: is this person truly John Doe? This way, under the verification mode, 
the system performs a “1 to 1” matching process where the test biometric template T is 
compared to the enrolled template TI associated with the claimed identity I. This matching 
process produces a single score s which is compared to a decision threshold δ in order to 
determine if the subject is a client (the identity claim is accepted as the score is higher than 
the threshold), or an impostor (the identity claim is rejected as the score is lower than the 
threshold).  
Typical verification applications include network logon, ATMs, physical access control, credit-
card purchases etc. 
  







Figure 13 Flowchart describing the identification (top) and verification (bottom) recognition processes 
in a typical biometric system. 
A1.2. Accuracy evaluation of biometric identification systems 
As described in the previous section, in biometrics, an identification task may be defined as a problem 
in which a biometric test sample has to be assigned to one of the identities corresponding to the 
enrolled biometric templates in a database. Therefore, the question being addressed is: Within this 
given database, who does this sample belong to? 
Two general identification scenarios are possible: open set and closed set. 
- Closed-set: in the closed-set scenario it is known beforehand that the test sample positively 
belongs to one of the identities included in the dataset. Therefore, the answer to the question 
raised above is “John Doe” (i.e. the searched identity within the database). In this scenario, 
identification systems give an output as a ranked list with the first M the most probable 
identity within the database for the test sample, where M>0, that is, the output cannot be an 
empty list. 
In the case of a closed set scenario, identification systems can make only one type of error: A search 
using a biometric sample of an enrolled individual returns an incorrect identity. This is considered a 
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- Open-set: the open-set scenario represents a more challenging problem than the closed-set 
case both from a technical and an evaluation point of view, as the test sample may or may not 
belong to one of the identities included in the dataset. Hence, there are two possible answers 
to the question raised above: “nobody” (i.e. in the case that the searched sample is not 
present in the database), or “John Doe” (i.e. in the case where the test sample does belong to 
one of the identities in the database). Therefore, in this scenario, the ranked list with M 
candidates can be empty, meaning that the searched subject is not in the database, i.e. M≥0. 
In the open-set scenario, identification systems can make two types of error:  
1) A search performed with a biometric sample of an individual not enrolled in the biometric 
database (a non-mated search) returns the identity of one or more enrolled subjects. This is 
considered a false alarm, because it returns a false identity.  
2) (Same as in the closed-set scenario). A search using a biometric sample of an enrolled 
individual (mated search) returns an incorrect identity. This is considered a miss, because it 
misses the correct identity. 
Most Automatic Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) used in the fight against criminal 
activities work under the open-set scenario. 
The open-set scenario comprises the type of error that can be committed in the closed-set 
scenario, therefore, we will define below the most common metrics used to evaluate the 
accuracy of open- set identification systems (as these can also be used for the closed-set).  
Accuracy assessment of identification systems is not a trivial task and different metrics have been 
defined in the literature with this objective. In the following we will present the most commonly 
used and accepted metrics as defined in the 2012 NIST Fingerprint Vendor Technology 
Evaluation, see Section 2.1 and reference [NIST2014]. 
False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR): is the fraction of the non-mated searches (i.e. searches of an 
identity that is not in the database), where one or more enrolled identities are returned at or above 
threshold δ. FPIR is a function of: the size of the enrolment set (N), length of the candidate list (M) 
and score threshold (δ). In the general case, this can be summarized as: 
FPIR(𝑁, 𝑀, 𝛿) =
Number of searches with any non − mates returned 
above threshold 𝛿 on candidate list of length 𝑀 
Number of non − mated searches conducted
 
False Negative Identification Rate (FNIR): is the fraction of the mated searches (i.e. searches of an 
identity that does exist in the database), where the enrolled mate is outside the top M rank or that 
the comparison score is below threshold δ. FNIR is a function of: the size of the enrolment set (N), 
length of the candidate list (M), score threshold (δ) and the number of top candidates being 
considered (R). In the general case this can be summarized as: 
FNIR(𝑁, 𝑀, 𝛿, 𝑅) =
Number of mates ouside top 𝑅 ranks or below 
threshold 𝛿 on candidate list of length 𝑀 
Number of mated searches conducted
 
Note that FNIR computation does not care about the cause of a miss: failure to correctly identify a 
sample (e.g. due to poor quality), failure to extract a template, failure to generate a comparison score 
and software crashes are all dealt in the same way. 
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It should also be highlighted that, in the most usual case, both the length of the candidate list and the 
number of top candidates being considered take the same value, that is, M=R. 
The terms “hit rate,” “reliability,” and “sensitivity” that have been mentioned in some literature on 
Automatic Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) are just the complement of FNIR, computed as 1-
FNIR. 
Detection Error Trade-off (DET) plots: DET characteristic curves are the primary accuracy metric for 
offline testing of biometric recognition algorithms. Each point on a DET curve exhibits the False 
Positive Identification Rate (FPIR) and False Negative Identification Rate (FNIR) associated with a 
certain threshold value. The DET curve spans the entire range of possible threshold values, which is 
normally the range of the comparison scores. To reveal the dependence of FNIR and FPIR at a fixed 
threshold the DET curves are connected at points where FNIRs and FPIRs are observed at the same 
threshold values. 
In a typical DET curve, FPIR is plotted on the x-axis and FNIR is plotted on the y-axis, giving uniform 
treatment to both types of error. In general, both axes use a logarithmic scale which spreads out the 
plot and helps to distinguish between different well-performing systems. A different DET curve is 
computed for every pair of values (M, R). As mentioned before, in order to simplify, it is very 
commonly assumed that M=R.  
An example of DET curves for different systems competing in FpVTE 2012 [NIST2014] is given in Figure 
14. A system presents better accuracy the closer its DET curve is to the bottom left corner of the plot. 
In the particular case of Figure 3 the best system would be the one represented with the red dotted 
line. 
  




Figure 14 Detection Error Trade-off (DET) curves corresponding to four systems participating in 
the NIST FpVTE 2012 competition. A better system is one that is closest to the bottom left corner. 
Figure extracted from [NIST2014]. 
 
Cumulative Match Characteristic (CMC): this is another widely used accuracy metric which 
corresponds to the fraction of the mated searches where the enrolled mate is at rank R or better, 
regardless of its comparison score. An example of CMC curves is shown in Figure 15. CMC is a special 
case of FNIR, or more precisely, the hit rate when the constraint on threshold is removed, that is: 
CMC(𝑁, 𝑀, 𝑅) = 1 − FNIR(𝑁, 𝑀, 𝛿 = 0, 𝑅) 
Rank-one hit rate, CMC (N,L,R = 1), is the most common accuracy metric reported in academic and 
AFIS-related literature. While the use of CMC is very widespread, it presents two major issues: 1) it 
makes strong or weak hits indistinguishable by ignoring similarity scores, and 2) it does not report on 
false alarms (i.e. a sample of an individual not enrolled in the database is mated to an enrolled 
identity), therefore, on its own, it should only be used to present results of systems working on closed-
sets. 
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Figure 15 Closed-set identification accuracy of two systems reported on the same database using 
CMC. 
A better system is one that is closest to the top left corner of CMC. In this example, system 1 has a 
higher identification rate up to rank 12. Beyond this rank, system 2 has a better identification rate. 
Hence, in this case, neither of the two systems being compared is systematically better than the 
other across all ranks. 
 
Failure to Extract a Template: Failure to extract a template is the fraction of images for which a 
template is not generated. Template generation can fail for the enrolment sample or the search 
sample. Although this is a metric that can be useful on its own and from which interesting conclusions 
may be drawn, in general it is included as a miss in the computation of FNIR. 
Failure to Match a Template: In some cases, recognition algorithms fail to execute one-to-many 
searches to produce comparison scores. The result is that a valid candidate list is not produced. Such 
failures might be voluntary (e.g. refusal to process a poor quality image) or involuntary (e.g. software 
crashes). Either way, it is an undesirable behaviour, and should be included in the computation of 
recognition errors, particularly to allow for fair comparison of submissions. In general, such failure 
cases are computed as a miss and included in the FNIR. As in the case of the failure to extract, this 
metric can also be reported on its own as an informative parameter regarding the accuracy of a 
system. 
A1.3. Introduction to AFIS  
This report is focused on the analysis of Automatic Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) and their 
use in a large scale law-enforcement scenario. 
An AFIS is an identification biometric system based on fingerprints. In the case of law enforcement 
scenarios, such systems work almost in all cases in the open-set mode. Therefore, all the concepts 
introduced above for open-set biometric identification systems are applicable to the case of an AFIS. 
The distinctive features of an AFIS with respect to other biometric identification systems come from 
the fact that fingerprints are used as the base for recognition. As such, in this section, some important 
concepts related to fingerprints which directly impact AFIS technology are introduced. 
The section is not intended as a detailed analysis and description of fingerprint recognition (this would 
fall out of the scope of the report), but rather as a tool of quick reference for the reader to understand 
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and form a general view of the most important fingerprint-related terms that are used throughout the 
main sections of the document. For exhaustive reading on fingerprint recognition systems we refer 
the reader to [Maltoni2009]. 
A1.3.1. General fingerprint-related concepts 
Terms will be introduced following the general flow-charts showed in Figures 1 and 2, that is: physical 
biometric trait, biometric sensor, biometric sample and biometric template.  
- Fingertip: the physical biometric trait used by AFIS to identify individuals is the fingertip of 
human fingers and thumb. The fingertip’s epidermis presents a unique pattern of 3D 
formations known as ridges and valleys. 
- Fingerprint scanner: multiple types of biometric scanner exist at present (see below the 
definition of inked and live-scanned fingerprints for further details). Although different 
technologies and methods are used, essentially all of them translate the physical 3D skin 
pattern of the fingertip into a 2D digital image. There are multi-finger and single-finger 
scanning devices depending on whether they are capable or not of acquiring more than one 
fingerprint at the same time. 
- Fingerprint: this is the biometric sample used by AFIS in the recognition process. It 
corresponds to the 2D image produced by the fingerprint sensor. In general this is a grey- scale 
image where ridges and valleys are visible usually in dark shades (ridges) and light shades 
(valleys). See Figure 16 for a flowchart showing a fingertip and its corresponding fingerprint 





Figure 16 Fingertip (left), fingerprint scanner (middle) and fingerprint image (right). 
It should be highlighted that, although strictly speaking a fingerprint is a 2D impression of the fingertip 
3D pattern, in practice in the literature, the term is largely used to also refer to the physical 3D skin 
pattern.  
- Minutiae points: although nowadays fingerprint templates contain a great diversity of 
information extracted from the fingerprint, the vast majority of fingerprint recognition 
algorithms use the minutiae points as the most distinctive features. The most common 
minutiae points are defined as the points where a ridge ends or where a ridge presents a 
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bifurcation (see Figure 17). The usual information that is stored in the fingerprint template for 
each minutiae point is: its coordinate within the image, its angle, its type and a reliability 
indicator. Although a standard ISO template exists to encode minutia data [ISO2011], most 
vendors have their own proprietary template format where additional information is stored. 
As defined in the previous sections, once the fingerprint templates have been generated, AFIS 
compare them to produce similarity scores and take a decision on the test sample. Such matching 




Figure 17 Examples of two minutiae points: a ridge end and a ridge bifurcation 
A1.3.2. Types of fingerprint data 
Although different categorizations of fingerprint data are possible [Champod2004], in this section we 
will focus on those types that typically have to be dealt with by AFIS. All the terms introduced in this 
section are systematically used throughout the report. A general diagram with the classification 









Figure 18 . Diagram with the most relevant types of fingerprint data mentioned in the report. 
Fingerprints that are acquired directly from the subject may be classified according to: 
- Type of acquisition sensor: inked / live-scanned. 
Inked fingerprints: also known as off-line fingerprints. They are typically obtained by smearing ink on 
the fingertip and creating an inked impression of the fingertip on paper. The inked impression is then 
digitized by scanning the paper using an optical scanner or a high-quality video camera (the most 
common resolution for the scanner/camera is 500dpi). The ink-technique often produces images that 
include regions with missing fingerprint information due to excessive or insufficient ink on the finger 
or excessive or insufficient finger pressure. 
Live-scanned fingerprints: A live-scan image, on the other hand, is acquired by scanning the tip of the 
finger directly, using a specific device that is capable of digitizing the fingerprint on contact. There are 
a number of live-scan sensing mechanisms (e.g. optical, capacitive, thermal, pressure-based, 
ultrasound etc.) that can be used to detect the ridges and valleys present on the fingertip. The most 
important part of a live-scan fingerprint scanner is the sensor (or sensing element), which is the 
component where the fingerprint image is formed. In many cases, in the literature, both terms, 
scanner and sensor, are used interchangeably to denote the whole scanning device. Such devices 
present different resolutions, the most typical being 500dpi and 1000dpi. 
The use of ink-techniques is gradually being replaced as live-scan acquisition technology is becoming 
more affordable. As a result, the databases that have been built by law enforcement agencies over a 
long period of time contain fingerprint images acquired by both off-line as well as live-scan scanners. 




at the time of acquisition 
Subject NOT present 
at the time of acquisition 
Inked (off-line) Live-scanned 




TEN PRINT CARD TEN PRINT CARD 
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image. In other words, an image acquired using an off-line scanner needs to be matched to an image 
acquired using live-scan scanners with the minimum loss of accuracy possible. 
Figure 19 shows some live-scan images acquired with different types of commercial live-scan devices 
and an off-line fingerprint image acquired with the ink technique. 
   
  
 
Figure 19 Examples of fingerprint images from (left to right and top to bottom): live-scan optical 
scanner, live-scan capacitive scanner, live-scan piezoelectric scanner, live-scan thermal scanner, inked 
impression. 
- Acquisition procedure: flat /rolled 
Flat fingerprints: these impressions (also called dab, slapped or plain) are obtained when the user 
simply places his/her fingertip on the acquisition surface (i.e. scanner or paper) and applies some 
pressure without moving it (see Figure 20 left). 
Rolled fingerprints: to obtain these impressions the user is required to roll a finger “nail-to-nail” on 
the scanner/paper, thus producing an unwrapped representation of the whole fingerprint pattern 
which carries more information than a flat impression (see Figure 20 right). It is often necessary for a 
trained fingerprint acquisition expert to assist the user in rolling his/her finger on the sensor/paper. 
The reader should be aware that, as shown in the diagram in Figure 18, the previous two classifications 
are not exclusive. That is, flat fingerprints can be both inked and live-scanned (depending on the 
acquisition device), the same way that rolled fingerprints can also be inked or live-scanned. 




Figure 20. The same finger acquired as a flat fingerprint (left) and as a rolled fingerprint (right). On the 
rolled impression, the portion corresponding to the flat fingerprint is highlighted in lighter grey. As may 
be observed, rolled fingerprints provide a larg 
In AFIS the previous fingerprint data is stored in ten print cards. A ten print card is a container, either 
in paper (for inked fingerprints) or a digital file (for live-scanned fingerprints) that comprises the 
fingerprints of all eight fingers and two thumbs of an individual, both flat and rolled. In the case of 
paper ten print cards, they are digitized using an optical scanner or a high definition camera (similar 
to what is done with single inked fingerprints). An example of a typical ten print card is shown in Figure 
21. 
Usually, as can be observed in Figure 21, in ten print cards, the flat fingerprints of the four fingers of 
each hand are acquired at the same time as “slaps” which may include also imprints of the second and 
third limb. Ten print cards may also include the two palm prints. 
In cases in which more than one ten print card of the same individual is available, some AFIS build a 
composite ten print card that contains the best quality individual fingerprints coming from the 
different ten print cards available (i.e. the best quality: left index flat, left index rolled, right index flat, 
right index rolled, middle finger flat etc.) 
As mentioned previously, ten print cards were initially enrolled as paper-and-ink records that were 
digitized in a successive step. However, currently these hard-copy cards are progressively being 
replaced by their electronic equivalent by directly capturing the fingerprints with live-scan scanners. 
In most cases AFIS store the digital ten print cards in electronic containers or files (also called cards) 
following the standard introduced by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
[NIST2013]. Alternatively, fingerprints may be transmitted in some loss-less image format (e.g. 
JPEG2000) where the link to other images and additional meta-data has to be established in a non-
standardized way. 




Figure 21 Example of a typical paper-and-ink ten print card. Source www.cplex.com. 
Latent fingerprints. In AFIS, especially in those applied in forensic applications and law-enforcement, 
latent fingerprints are of great interest. These are fingerprint impressions (usually partial) left behind 
by an individual (usually a criminal) on a surface (in most cases at a crime scene). Such impressions 
are later recovered and digitized by forensic experts. The main difference with respect to the previous 
type of fingerprint data is that, in this case, the individual is not present at the time of the acquisition. 
Therefore, in the case of bad quality fingerprints (e.g. a very limited portion is only available) a re-
acquisition is not possible.  
Latent fingerprints are in general not clearly visible and their detection often requires some means of 
chemical development and enhancement. Powder dusting, ninhydrin spraying, iodine fuming, and 
silver nitrate soaking are the four most commonly used techniques of latent print development. Some 
typical examples of latent fingerprint are shown in Figure 22, where it can be observed that the quality 
is much lower than that of the inked and live-scanned fingerprints shown in Figures 19, 20 and 21. 
Latent fingerprints are also referred to in the literature as fingermarks. While probably this is the most 
precise term (or simply marks), the most extended one is latent fingerprints (or simply latents). In the 
present report we will use this last term (latent fingerprints) to refer to this type of fingerprint data. 




Figure 22 Typical examples of latent fingerprints. Source http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/. 
The reader should notice that this variety of fingerprint data (inked, live-scanned, flat, rolled, latents) 
poses a big challenge to AFIS that have to cope with all the possible types of fingerprint and match 
them against each other while maintaining high accuracy. 
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Annex 2: Comparative table between Prüm and SIS-II 
  
Aspect Prüm Envisaged SIS-II with AFIS 
Availability 24/7 but only maximum response 
time of 24 hours is guaranteed. 
Could be faster at certain times. 
24/7 without restriction. Response 
time may only be limited by the 
available resources of the central 
database. 
Accessibility In the course of individual 
investigation cases. 
“Administrative” purposes are 
excluded. Access take place in the 
course of controls at Schengen 
external borders and for checks 




Not possible because of 24 hours 
constraint. 
It is the case today for 
alphanumerical data and it is also 
expected for fingerprints 
Accuracy Individual response depends on the 
national AFIS and its configuration. 
No uniform thresholds whatsoever. 
Would depend on thresholds 
agreed at central level. 
Data size Joint AFIS data of all connected 
countries, presumably in the range 
of tens of millions of persons. 
Alerts related to persons (790 000) 
with fingerprints (97.000), 




Queries can be generated quite 
conveniently but response in each 
queried country needs to be 
triggered manually. 
Interface and response should be 




Only hit lists and reference data 
(dactyloscopic data and a reference 
number) in a first step.  
Additional information about 
certain hits needs to be requested 
via channels not specified in the 
Council Decision and with no time 
frame specification. 
All information attached by the MS 
which has issued the alert in SIS-II, 
including full access to the relevant 
fingerprint data. Supplementary 
information can be requested from 
national SIRENE offices. According 
to SERENE manual section 1.13, the 
SIRENE Bureau shall answer all 
requests for information on alerts 
and hit procedures, made by the 
other Member States via their 
SIRENE Bureaux, as soon as 
possible. In any event a response 
shall be given within 12 hours. (See 
also Section 1.13.1. on indication of 
urgency in SIRENE forms). 
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Annex 3: Introductory note sent to MS prior the JRC visit 
 
JRC study on AFIS technology for its introduction in the SIS -II database 
Outline of Technical meeting with national AFIS Experts  
 
USE CASES 
What are the typical use cases for Member States with respect to their national AFIS and to future 
access to fingerprints in SIS?  
For each use case: 
- General description 
- Specific examples 
- Expected response time 
- Type of response: single answer or ranked list 
- Acceptable performance with respect to accuracy 
- Type of data involved 
AFIS SYSTEM 
What national AFIS is in use? 
What type of templates are involved?  
Is it compatible with ISO/NIST standards or other standards? 
Does it have a quality check and, if yes, when and how is it applied? 
Is there a minimum quality threshold? 
How are bad quality samples dealt with? 
What performance/accuracy evaluation is available and how was it done? 
What search filters does the AFIS have? For instance: 
- Date of data 
- Type of data (flat, rolled, latent…) 
- Origin of data (country) 
- Fingerprint class (right loop, left loop, whorl…) 
- Quality of data 
What is the level of human intervention? 
When do expert examiners intervene in the process? What is their role? 
How are the AFIS results checked?  
Do you consider a totally lights-out scenario? 
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What type of maintenance of the AFIS system do you perform? 
DATA 
Do Member States have a centralized database or are the data otherwise organized? 
Size and nature of the fingerprint data:  
- Flat/Rolled?  
- Inked/live-scanned?  
- Latent? 
Do you consider composite ten print cards? 
Do you keep a database of fingerprints? Is it a separate database to that of ten prints? 
How are the ten print cards acquired? 
What methodologies do you use for the development of latent fingerprints? 
What experience exists on interoperability of data obtained by different methodologies? 
Do you have any statistics on the quality of the different types of fingerprint data?  
Is there a minimum number of minutiae for a fingerprint to be stored? 
Is data flagged according to its type/quality/origin…? 
How is the upload process of fingerprints into SIS-II organized? 
What methodologies do you apply to ensure the integrity of the enrolled data? 
LIVE DEMO 
Possibility of real operational demo on the AFIS in use? 
Possibility of quality checks on the database or parts of it? 
 
 




How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://publications.europa.eu/howto/index_en.htm), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 





Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Free phone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
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